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Abstract
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a primary tool for counter-terrorism operations,
ranging from resiliency and influence to interdiction on threats stemming from illicit
overt and clandestine network operations. In an ideal world, SNA would provide a
perfect course of action to eliminate dangerous situations that terrorist organizations
bring. Unfortunately, the covert nature of terrorist networks makes the effects of these
techniques unknown and possibly detrimental. To avoid potentially harmful changes
to enemy networks, tactical involvement must evolve, beginning with the intelligent
use of network infiltration through the application of the node insertion problem. The
framework for the node insertion problem includes a risk-benefit model to assess the
utility of various node insertion scenarios. This model incorporates local, intermedi-
ate and global SNA measures, such as Laplacian centrality and assortative mixing, to
account for the benefit and risk. Application of the model to the Zachary Karate Club
produces a set of recommended insertion scenarios. A designed experiment validates
the robustness of the methodology against network structure and characteristics. Ul-
timately, the research provides an SNA method to identify optimal and near-optimal
node insertion strategies and extend past node utility models into a general form with
the inclusion of benefit, risk, and bias functions.
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A RISK BASED APPROACH TO NODE INSERTION WITHIN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
While social network analysis (SNA) is not a new discipline, first gaining notoriety fol-
lowing three independent research movements occurring in the 1930s, its importance
has exploded in recent years due to the rise of terrorism [7]. A terrorist organization
is one that takes part in actions including, but not limited to, “kidnapping, assassi-
nation, hijacking, nuclear, biological, or chemical agents, the use of firearms or other
dangerous devices” [8] or endorses such actions.
The United States’ primary goal is to achieve and protect “national interests through
diplomacy, economic development, cooperation and engagement, and through the
power of [its] ideas”, but in a world where possible nuclear proliferation and terror-
ism go hand-in-hand “the willingness and ability to resort to force in defense of our
national interests and the common good” becomes a necessity [9]. The mitigation and
elimination of terrorism is crucial, and as the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
states, “the American people and interests will not be secure from attacks until this
threat is eliminated–its primary individuals and groups rendered powerless, and its
message relegated to irrelevance” [10]. The Department of Homeland Security echoes
these focuses with their strategic priorities, shown in the following quote [11]:
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“The evolution of the terrorist threat demands a well-informed, highly
agile, and well-networked group of partners and stakeholders to antici-
pate, detect, target, and disrupt threats that challenge national security,
economic prosperity, and public safety. To improve overall unity of effort,
we will work with our partners to identify, investigate, and interdict le-
gitimate threats as early as possible; expand risk-based security; focus on
countering violent extremism and helping to prevent complex mass casu-
alty attacks; reduce vulnerabilities by denying resources and targets; and
uncover patterns and faint signals through enhanced data integration and
analysis.”
In an ideal world, SNA would provide perfect insight as to the correct course of ac-
tion (COA) to eliminate the dangerous situations that terrorism and its associated
organizations bring. Unfortunately, the covert nature, and the unforeseen secondary
and tertiary effects of dealing with theses networks, makes determining the best COA
difficult.
Network research in the private sector emphasizes primarily resiliency, whereas de-
fense research additionally emphasizes network interdiction and influence. Joint Pub-
lication 3-03 specifically defines this interdiction as “actions to divert, disrupt, de-
grade, or destroy” a network [12]. Benjamin in 2008 [13] identifies these actions
as “tactical counterterrorism” and compares them specifically to “the catching and
killing of terrorists and disruption of their operations”. Benjamin also states the need
to continue these methods, while calling for a “significant departure from the current
policy” in strategic counterterrorism (CT) [13].
While the need for the continuation of tactical counterterrorism is apparent, methods
for this tactical involvement must evolve. Currently, the selection and removal of
key network actors and relationships is the primary way by which the United States
attempts to combat terrorist threats. Kathleen Carley in 2003 supported this by
asserting that “node changes can be more devastating on system performance than
2
relationship changes” [14].
While Carley emphasizes node removal and isolation as the most effective node
changes due to their practicality, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism in 2011
[10] identifies the need to diminish the strength of “local and regional affiliates...monitor
communications...drive fissures between these groups and their bases of support”,
showing the need for multifaceted CT methods [14]. While the current tactics seem
to be effective in removing individual threats, the integration of other methods could
provide additional insight to the counterterrorism decision landscape.
1.2 Undercover Operations and Network Infiltration
The evolution of tactical counterterrorism begins with the intelligent use of network
infiltration, or the covert insertion of assets into a network, otherwise known as node
insertion. The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) defines an undercover operation
as “an investigation involving a series of related undercover activities over a period of
time by an undercover employee” [15]. These operations aid in the “detection, preven-
tion and prosecution of white collar crimes, public corruption, terrorism, organized
crime, offenses involving controlled substances, and other priority areas of investi-
gation” [15]. The systematic use of this could provide opportunities to increase the
overall effectiveness of US CT efforts.
Fijnaut and Marx [16] trace formal undercover operations to 16th century Europe,
used in order to secure “political, military, and economic interests” later highlighting
their role in the formation of policing agencies in the United States. A more infamous
instance of undercover operations occurred with Operation Black Biscuit. Staged in
response to the growth of the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC), Operation
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Black Biscuit resulted in the indictment of sixteen Hell’s Angels’ members, raids all
thorughout the western United States, and the seizure of over 1,600 pieces of evidence
[17]. However, this operation is seen as a classic example of “the misuse of informers”
both because of illicit actions some of these informers took part in and the handling
of these agents following the culmination of the operation [18].
In terms of network infiltration, information collection, and overall disruption, the
operations was a success, but Droban in 2007 [19] adds a clarification by saying “the
operatives may have crippled the Hell’s Angels enterprise, but like a true crime fam-
ily, the club was self-perpetuating and there would always be replacements.” This
statement is true but it is also important to note that the network never regained
the level of power and influence it had prior to the operation. The clarification again
highlights the dynamic nature of clandestine organizations.
The purpose behind node insertion is two-fold: information collection and future
network disruption. For the collection purpose, it allows for the possible gather-
ing of intelligence directly from the network, instead of through reconnaissance or
informants, which could prove unreliable. By applying node insertion, information
regarding the individuals within the network, their involvement with other organiza-
tions, possible past and future network activities or operations, and even the means
by which the network operates becomes obtainable. Even the determination of group
ideology and motivations becomes possible prior to the network’s execution of some
major event.
For future network disruption, an asset inserted into a network prior to a proposed
key actor’s removal, or any other node changes, might allow for easier degradation of
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relationships. While this second purpose requires more intelligence on the network
to determine which relationships should be degraded, assumptions could be made in
order to apply the node insertion methodology. This could allow for the elimination
of multiple actors, or lines of communication, at a single instant, possibly creating a
disconnect large enough to completely dissolve the network, or disrupt it to the point
where it no longer poses a legitimate threat.
1.3 Problem Statement
According to FBI doctrine, “any official considering approval or authorization of a
proposed undercover application shall weigh the risks and benefits of the operation”
[15]. While protocol exists for undercover operations, there does not seem to be
objective or quantitative methodologies to determine these risks and benefits, only
subjective definitions.
This research aims to provide a structured methodology for covert network infil-
tration through the application of node insertion. This includes the formulation of
quantitative risk and benefit measures from the perspective of the inserted node. The
use of these two independent measure sets allows for the creation of a trade off space,
and ultimately a pareto frontier for possible recommendations. From the analysis we
hope to gain recommendations for the most effective node insertion scenarios, specif-
ically to which actors in the network the inserted node should establish relationships.
The ultimate goal is to provide the ability to make smarter decisions regarding under-
cover operations and node insertion when compared to current qualitative method-
ologies. While this analysis will be performed on randomly generated networks, the
methodology remains applicable to real world networks. The direct application of this
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research is towards counterterrorism, but node insertion applies to the infiltration of
any clandestine network, which could include human trafficking cells, gangs, or drug
distribution networks, among others.
1.4 Research Scope
The scope of this research extends to only social networks. While node insertion could
apply to computer network interdiction or disruption, the methodology does not ad-
dress the translation to a cyber-based network. Within a social network sense, the
scope is limited to the identification of relationships for a covert operative to make,
and does not provide information on the strength of the intended relationships. Nei-
ther does it involve the selection of a specific network that would be most susceptible
to node insertion, nor lend any insight to the actual covert action of the insertion.
1.5 Assumptions
Within the analysis, there exists several different stages. Governing assumptions are
made initially and then dropped as the analysis progresses.
The first is that the network model is 100% certain, meaning all of the nodes and
edges that are currently in the network model account for 100% of the true nodes and
edges. The second is that the the network is unweighted and undirected, meaning
that only the relationships existing between between actors matter, not the strength
of the relationship, or where the influence in the relationship comes from. The third is
that the network is not dynamic, and will not change as a result of the recommended
insertion course of action. With this it is also assumed that the communities within
the network are also formed with certainty. Networks following these assumption are
under the category of Overt Networks.
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The next assumption set are under the category of Clandestine Networks. As we
encounter clandestine networks, the uncertainty within a network increases, allowing
for the possibility of both missing nodes and missing edges. By allowing for this
uncertainty, the fidelity of this system increases in that it more accurately models
the current intelligence gathering and network disruption situations. However, it also
increases the difficulty in recommending the truly best node insertion strategy.
The inclusion of dynamic networks in this analysis continues to increase both the
fidelity and difficulty of the analysis, making the selection of a node insertion strat-
egy a dynamic decision.
An assumption exists on the actual insertion of nodes. Operationally it would be
unrealistic to attempt to create relationships with every node within a large network.
The risk involved in creating this large number of relationships and the risk involved
with remaining inconspicuous while maintaining them is extremely large. Knowing
this, there is is a realistic limit on the number of relationships that can be created for
an inserted node. The assumption then is that the maximum number of relationships
that can be added is is a function of the total number of node within the network.
1.6 Organization
The structure of the research falls into four remaining chapters. The second chapter
involves a literature review of the applicable techniques and measures involved in
the quantification of the risk and benefit within node insertion. The third chapter
outlines the methodology of research, and creates a framework for how the analysis
will be performed, in addition to justification on why the framework is both correct
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and appropriate for the research. The fourth chapter applies the methodology to
multiple experimental runs and case studies, allowing for a real world application of
the proposed technique and theoretical results. In addition, it will provide results
on the differences between node insertion techniques on differing networks. The fifth
chapter discusses the results of the analysis, also analyzing the overall effect of the
technique and identifying areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review
Before attempting to explain node insertion analysis techniques among different net-
works it is important to deliver a review of the past Social Network Analysis (SNA)
techniques, the understanding of which is crucial to the following research. Leverag-
ing past research allows for the research at hand to complement previous works and
provide a basis for the methodology used in the application of node insertion to real
world networks. To do this, we highlight work with network structures, centrality
measures, structural holes, network functionality, and network disruption.
Networks in general can range from simple adjacency matrices where only the pres-
ence of a connection is important, to weighted, and directed networks which show
not only the strength of a connection, but also the directions of each connection, an
example of which is shown in Figure 1. Overt networks are characterized as being
known with certainty; they are often the focus of SNA, historically.
1 2
3
4 5
1
7
3 4
6
58
2
Figure 1. Weighted Directed Network Example
As fewer assumptions are made within the network of interest, SNA becomes more
difficult. With Clandestine networks, where networks are uncertain, the stability of
analysis becomes an issue [20]. Dynamic networks, where a network changes in re-
sponse to stimuli, is no longer out of the question and precautions need to be made in
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order to ensure actions do not affect the network in a way detrimental to the stake-
holders of the analysis.
In order to explain the measures identified in the following sections, an example
graph will be used. This graph is shown in Figure 2.
1
2 3
4
5
6
Figure 2. Example Network
2.1 Network Structure
In the study of networks, the importance of the overall structure has been made known
by authors such as o¨s and Re´yni, Watts and Strogatz, and Baraba´si and Albert. The
structure itself of the network gives insight to the actors with high social capital,
purely based on the presence or absence of lines of communication. While looking
solely at structure may lack the insight that could be gained from an analysis of the
characteristics of actors and the purpose behind the links, studies of the structure
allow for an initial profile of the network to be created.
Scale Free.
The first network structure of interest is the scale free network, introduced by Baraba´si
and Albert in 1999 [21]. This network type is based on the degree distribution of the
network, which allows for the elicitation of certain parameters that describe the extent
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to which a network is scale free. Given a graph G = (V,E), with V as the set of
vertices in G and E as the set of edges between each vertices in V . The degree of
a node i, or di, is the number of edges that come from that node and extend out to
other nodes. The mathematical interpretation of this is shown in Equations 1a and
1b.
di =
∑
j∈E
Aij ∀ i (1a)
dj =
∑
i∈E
Aij ∀ j (1b)
The ith, jth position in Aij represents the existence of a connection or the weight
of a relationship between the ith and jth nodes of the adjacency matrix A. For an
unweighted, undirected network is binary. Because of this, the indegree of node i, the
number of relationships coming into node i, is equivalent to the outdegree of node i,
the number of relationships coming out of node i. This is not necessarily the case
with a directed network where Aij is not always equivalent to Aji. When this occurs,
the indegree and outdegree become nontrivial.
In a scale free network, higher degree nodes are less common than low degree nodes.
The degree distribution of a network is based on the overall frequency that a degree
of k occurs. Examples of scale free networks include citation networks, and airline
travel networks [22].
Networks of this structure are defined using the idea of power laws, and more specif-
ically with the exponent of the power law, α, which is a constant for each network
[23]. Equations 2 and 3 below define the relationships between pk, k, and α. pk is
this frequency of the appearance of a node with a degree equal to k. According to
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Newman, the exponent of the power law, α,typically has values between 2 and 3 for
scale free networks.
ln pk = −α ln k + c (2)
pk = Ck
−α (3)
C is defined as the constant, ec. Newman also explains that bias occurs when using
these straight line fits to determine the α for a particular network. To remedy this
problem, he identifies Equation 4 as a more dependable way to calculate the exponent
for a network [24].
α = 1 +N
[∑
i
ln
di
dmin − 12
]−1
(4)
di is the degree of node i and kmin is the lowest degree for which the power law
holds. This dmin value is such that the distribution is monotonically decreasing and
for Equation 4 works well for dmin > 6 [23].
An example of a scale free network, specifically the 9/11 terrorist network collected
by Krebs, is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Krebs’ 9/11 Terrorist Network Scale Free [1]
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Random Graphs.
The second network structure is that of a random graph, which is generated from a
uniform distribution with exactly n nodes and m edges. Newman identifies that a
random graph is not defined in terms of a single network but with an “ensemble of
networks”, where there is a distribution for all graphs where P (G) = 1
Ω
where P (G)
is probability of a certain random graph appearing. [23]. Ω defines the total number
of possible graphs that can occur in the ensemble [23]. The seminal paper on this
structure was written by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi in 1959 [25]. An example of what is now
called an ER random graph is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Example ER Random Graph [2]
The generation of random graphs can be governed by necessitating the structure fol-
low certain parameters, such as the number of edges, mean degree, and even global
clustering coefficient. True ER Random graphs have a global clustering coefficient
of essentially zero. Normally, random graphs tend to have a small diameter, usually
around log n
log np
, given the expected degree of a node is at least 1 [26].
These graphs can also be created using the idea of preferential attachment, where
nodes with high degree have a higher probability of being a part of a newly created
edge, in order to create random scale free networks. The degree distributions of ran-
dom graphs also seem to follow a more bell-shaped degree distribution, in contrast to
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the monotonically decreasing degree distribution of true scale free networks.
Small World.
The work of Watts and Strogatz in the late 1990s introduced the small world network
model as a mix between Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks and simple lattice networks
with boundary conditions [27]. A lattice network is one where no variation exists
within the degree and relationship pattern of each node. The result is a constant
local clustering coefficient, which is further explained in Section 2.5.
The difference between a circle network and a random network comes from the act of
rewiring, or the exchanging or relocation of the edges of a specific actor [27]. For this
process, the parameter p defines the probability of the occurrence for a rewiring of a
node. The probability remains the same for each node, no matter its degree, which
is different from preferential attachment, where higher degree nodes have a higher
probability of receiving an additional edge.
A selected node can undergo one of two different rewiring models. The first is where a
node is selected for rewiring and one of its current edges is deleted, followed by the ad-
dition of a new edge, or ”shortcut” [23]. The second model does not delete the initial
edge, but solely performs the rewiring. It is important to note that if p is equal to 1,
the result of the rewiring process would be a random graph with n nodes and m edges.
Examples of a small world network includes the famed “Six Degrees of Separation”,
which states that no one person is more than six contacts way from another person in
terms of relationships. Biological networks also seem follow the small world network
model [28]. An example of a small world network is shown in Figure 5 .
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Figure 5. Watts and Strogatz’ Small World Model [3]
2.2 Centrality Measures
Throughout the study of networks in the last sixty years, especially social networks,
arguably the most influential and well studied measures are those involved with cen-
trality. In general, a node’s centrality allows for the measure of its overall importance
in the network. The idea of centrality, first introduced by Alex Bavelas in 1948 [29]
as a means for explanation of human communication, has evolved into the multiple
measures we know today including the centralities of degree, closeness, betweenness,
and eigenvector, among others .
While it is generally accepted that the influence of an actor within a network is
strongly correlated with its centrality, different centrality measures allow for strongly
competing ideas as to which node has the most power, or has the most social capital
as defined by Newman [23]. Others like Cook et al. [30], and Bonacich [31] have
determined the need for a family of centrality measures to define the power that an
actor has in a network. The following sections will compare the four centralities men-
tioned because collectively, these four measures seems to describe nodes adequately
enough to allow for sufficient analysis [6].
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Types of Centrality Measures.
According to Everett and Borgatti [32], three types of centrality measures exist,
which encompass the possible conceivable measures known thus far. The three types
include induced, endogenous, and exogenous centralities. Induced centralities are
made up of any measures that involve the calculation of a change in some network
structure, specifically dealing with graph invariants, or properties which depend on
“graph structure and not on a representation or a labeling of a graph” [32]. This
induced centrality, Cf (x), is specifically defined in Equation 5.
Cf (x) = f(G)− f(G− {x}) (5)
The variable x is the removed entity, which extends to a vertex or an edge. G− {x}
then is the subgraph with the entity of interest removed. Because induced centralities
are a result of the difference between a graph and a particular subgraph, it follows
that any two vertex or edge removals that result in isomorphic subgraphs, or the same
subgraphs, should have the same induced centrality.
Everett and Borgatti also show that the induced centrality of a removed entity is
made up of both endogenous and exogenous centralities, relating induced centrality
to “total centrality” [32]. Endogenous centralities are the centralities associated with
solely the entity of interest, whereas exogenous centralities are associated with the
entity of interest and its neighbors. Within a directed network for example, degree
centrality, previously outlined in Section 2.2, is made up of in-degree, the endogenous
centrality, and out-degree, the exogenous centrality [32].
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Degree Centrality.
Degree centrality is the simplest of the centrality measures. Introduced by Bavelas
and mathematically defined by Freeman, it measures the number of contacts an actor
is involved with. In Freeman’s words, “the degree of point, pi, is simply the count of
the number of other points, where i 6= j, that are adjacent to it and with which it is,
therefore, in direct contact” [33]. While other more involved centrality measures ex-
ist, degree centrality allows for the initial analysis of a network, relating overall social
capital to the number of contact an actor maintains. It acts as the backbone for all
other measures explained in the following sections. It is calculated using Equation 1a
or 1b, shown in Section 2.1.
The degree centralities for the example network in Figure 2, along with the unity-
based normalization values, are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Example Network Degree Centrality
Node Degree Normalized
1 3 0.67
2 1 0.00
3 3 0.67
4 4 1.00
5 1 0.00
6 2 0.33
Node 4 is the most central actor with a degree of four, while nodes two and five seem
have the least importance. In terms of degree centrality, node 4 is the most powerful
actor.
Closeness Centrality.
Viewed as the independence of an actor, closeness centrality relates power of an actor
to “the extent that it can avoid the control potential of others” [33]. Freeman also
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highlights Beauchamp’s definition, which follows more of a behavioral science model.
For Beauchamp, closeness is “optimum...efficiency” [34]. In more specific terms, close-
ness is defined as the average geodesic distance from point pi to pj where i 6= j for
all combinations of vertices in the network. The geodesic distance more simply is
the shortest path from one vertex to another and is also used in measuring network
functionality, explained in Section 2.5.
Newman identifies closeness in multiple ways, shown in Equations 6a and 6b [23].
Ci =
1
`i
=
n∑
j dij
(6a)
C ′i =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
1
dij
(6b)
dij is defined as the length of the geodesic path from node i to j; and `i is the farness
of from node i, or the mean of all geodesic paths from each node to every other node.
Geodesic distance is further explained in Section 2.5. According to Newman, Equa-
tion 6a is the most widely used due to the fact that any unconnected components in
social networks are generally disregarded. Equation 6b is the harmonic mean close-
ness and allows for the calculation of closeness centrality for networks with multiple
components, or ones that are not connected.
Newman also identifies some weaknesses of closeness centrality relating to the range
of the values within a network. This makes it difficult to determine differences be-
tween actors and allows for large variance in the closeness of each node with minimal
structure change. This phenomenon was analyzed by Herland with results which sup-
port Newman’s claims [35]. The closeness of an actor dropped dramatically with the
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addition of new nodes and edges, which relates to an increase in the average geodesic
distance for the network. The amount of variance within the individual scores also
changes across networks, suggesting that different networks respond differently to
changes in their structure [35].
In terms of node insertion, the idea of closeness is relative. If an inserted node has
high closeness, the node could be involved with a large amount of the information
sharing within the network. While the benefit to such a position could be high, from
an information collection perspective the risk for this asset could be even higher, com-
ing from possible interactions with highly connected members of a network. Analysis
must take into account these risks when determining the best possible scenario for
node insertion. Closeness centrality does not allow for the calculation of induced cen-
trality because the removal of a node or edge could result in a disconnected graph [32].
The closeness centralities for the example network in Figure 2 using Equation 6a
are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Example Network Closeness Centralities
Node Closeness Normalized
1 0.1429 0.69
2 0.0909 0.00
3 0.1429 0.69
4 0.1667 1.00
5 0.1000 0.12
6 0.1111 0.27
Node four has the highest closeness centrality, while nodes two and five have the
lowest. The small range in values addressed by Newman is seen here as well. The
range from node four to node two is only 0.0758.
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Betweenness Centrality.
Betweenness centrality identifies actors that lie between different paths to connecting
other actors, and as suggested by Bavelas, is another measure of centrality [29]. Free-
man states that “a person in such a position can influence the group by withholding
or distorting information in transmission” [33]. Everett and Borgatti [32] highlight
betweeness as an endogenous centrality measure. The equation to calculate the be-
tweenness of a node i, or bi, is shown in Equation 7 . Freeman also identifies that
calculating betweenness becomes increasingly complex when more than one geodesic
path connects a set of points.
bi =
∑
i
∑
j
gikj
gij
, i 6= j 6= k (7)
gijk is defined as the number of geodesic paths from node i to node j that include
node k, whereas gij is the total number of geodesic paths from node i to j. The
betweenness centralities for the example network in Figure 2 are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Example Network Betweenness Centralities
Node Betweenness Normalized
1 8 0.80
2 0 0.00
3 2 0.20
4 10 1.00
5 0 0.00
6 0 0.00
Node four has the highest betweenness centrality, followed by node one. The three
nodes that have betweenness of zero do not lie on any shortest path. If the aim of
network interdiction was to isolate two sets of nodes, it would be beneficial to remove
the nodes of high betweenness.
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Eigenvector Centrality.
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of indirect connections and relates the social cap-
ital of an actor to the social capital of his connections, meaning an influential actor
is connected to other influential members of a network. Emphasized by Bonacich
in 1972 [36], this centrality measure takes into account the entire structure of the
network, and not just the structure of the ego within a network. An ego, according
to Borgatti is “the person whose social capital we are measuring” [37]. It explicitly
comes from the eigenvector, ~x, associated with the leading eigenvalue, λi, in the ad-
jacency matrix, a value that satisfies A~x = λ~x . Alternatively, this is the eigenvalue
that satisfies the inequality λi > λk for any k 6= i.
Because finding the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix can be computation-
ally expensive, other methods can be implemented. The power law method is one
such way to decrease this computational load and involves solely the calculation of
the leading eigenvector and leading eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. The method
involves an initial nonzero vector x0 and the matrix multiplication of this vector and
the adjacency matrix A over multiple iterations, until the change occurring between
xi and xi+1 is less than some predetermined threshold, usually a few orders of mag-
nitude larger than the machine accuracy value of the coding language used. The
pseudocode for this algorithm is shown in Figure 6.
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Algorithm 1 Power Method(A, , error)
Initialize x0, µ0
while error >  do
C = A× x0
if max(C) > min(C) then
µ = max(C)
else
µ = min(C)
x0 =
1
µ
× C
error = |µ0 − µ|
µ0 = µ
end
return x0, µ
Figure 6. Power Method Pseudocode
x0 is a random, nonzero 1×m vector.  is the acceptable tolerance while error itself
is the difference between iterations of the eigenvalue, µ0. These values will converge
to the eigenvector and eigenvalue of the matrix respectively. For the example network
shown in Figure 2 the eigenvector centralities are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Example Network Eigenvector Centralities
Node Value
1 0.4491
2 0.1631
3 0.5095
4 0.5641
5 0.2048
6 0.3899
Node four has the highest eigenvector centrality, but it is closely followed by node
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three. Previously, nodes one and three were tied in importance, but a shift in rank
occurs when dealing with eigenvector centrality due to node three’s connection to
nodes one, four, and six, three highly connected network members. Node one connects
to nodes three, four, and two, the latter of which is not well connected.
2.3 Community Structure
At a strategic level, the analysis of the interaction between networks dominates. At
the operational level of analysis, interactions between network subgroups become
important. At the tactical level, the interactions between individual nodes become
crucial. These subnetworks, or communities, bring different information to the fore-
ground following analysis. The allow for the assessment of different network com-
ponents, and the relationships between smaller groups of actors within the network,
instead of a full network analysis, or an individual node analysis.
In graph theory, a clique is defined as a subset of vertices of a graph where each
vertex connects to every other vertex in the subset [38]. The formation of commu-
nities is far less stringent, but relates to the same concept. Girvan and Newman in
2002 explain that this phenomenon occurs when “subsets of vertices within which
vertex-vertex connections are dense, but between which connections are less dense”
[28]. They exist because they seem to provide a natural barrier from outside intru-
sions [4].
The process of determining where a community exists relates to the problem of
graph partitioning, one of Karp’s original non deterministic polynomial (NP) com-
plete proofs [39]. Due to this, heuristic methods are necessary to approach a near
optimal solution, without an optimal solution being guaranteed. Multiple methods
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exist for this purpose, including hierarchical clustering and edge betweenness. The
former attempts to find the central points in a community and the latter attempts
to find points not central to any one community, or broker points, which make con-
nections between communities [28]. These brokers also tend to fill structural holes,
which are further explained in Section 2.4.
The most common method of determining communities is the method of modularity
maximization [40], which describes the extent to which like actors, or actors of the
same community, are connected to each other. The equation for modularity, Q, for a
network is shown in Equation 8a [23].
Q =
1
2m
∑
ij
Bijδ(ci, cj) (8a)
Bij = Aij − didj
2m
(8b)
ci defines which community node i belongs to; δ(ci, cj) is 1 if ci and cj are the same,
and zero otherwise; and Bij is known as the modularity matrix, which is calculated
using Equation 8b. Bij is the difference between Aij and the ratio of connections
between groups that would have occurred at random, identified by
didj
2m
where m is
the total number of edges in G.
Newman and Girvan extend this technique to a much simpler equation to determine
the modularity for unweighted and undirected networks, shown in Equation 9.
Q =
k∑
i=1
(
ei
m
−
(
di
2m
)2)
(9)
24
ei is the number of vertices within community i that do not go between communities,
where k is the total number of communities. di is the sum of degrees of each node
within community i. m is the total number of vertices in the network.
The tendency of communities to exist between nodes of the same demographic has
also been studied, and is known as assortative mixing. With this, the communities are
not generated based on the modularity, but are created using other qualities like age,
race, sex, and even political background [23]. The modularity is then calculated to
assess whether or not the communities in the network actually form based on these
demographics. The calculation of this assortivity coefficient [23] is very similar to
Equation 8a, but the δ(ci, cj) is replaced with just xixj where xi is the demographic
value for node i. This is then normalized by dividing over a perfectly mixed network
where edges only fall between vertices of the same demographics. The calculation of
the assortivity coefficient, r, is shown Equation 10.
r =
∑
ij(Aij − didj/2m)xixj∑
ij(diδij − didj/2m)xixj
(10)
xi is the value associated with the demographic of node i. δij is the ith, jth position
in the Kronecker matrix of a perfectly mixed network, where a one exists if node i
and node j are of the same demographic, and a zero exists otherwise. Assortative
mixing by degree is the tendency of nodes to connect to other nodes of like degree.
For this, Equation 10 is altered to include the degrees of nodes i and j, instead of the
demographics of i and j. This alteration is shown in Equation 11.
r =
∑
ij(Aij − didj/2m)didj∑
ij(diδij − didj/2m)didj
(11)
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Figure 7 shows the community detection analysis of Rocco and Marquez applied to
the Krebs 9/11 network previously shown in Figure 3 [4].
Figure 7. Krebs 9/11 Network Community Structure [4]
Rocco and Marquez [4] use the Fast Modularity technique in an application of com-
munity structure to the idea of vulnerability sets, or vertices that could eliminate the
connections between communities.
The example network was analyzed to determine its community structure, which
is shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Example Network Community Structure
Node Community
1 1
2 1
3 2
4 2
5 2
6 2
It seems that nodes 1 and 2 are within the same community, with the remaining nodes
being a part of the second community.
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The use of community analysis could allow for a node to be inserted into a com-
munity that is less beneficial, perhaps based on a relative lack of modularity, but
also less dangerous in terms of risk than being involved, or associated with, a more
densely connected group.
2.4 Structural Holes
First introduced by Burt 1992 as an expansion of previous network structure analysis,
structural holes exist as “separation between nonredundant contacts” [41]. Redun-
dancy exists when contacts are connected to the same contacts as their neighbors,
similar to the triads that are created when addressing clustering within a network.
Burt identifies two types of redundancy; cohesion and structural equivalence. Cohe-
sion occurs when two contacts are strongly connected to each other, whereas equiva-
lence occurs when two actors “are related in the same ways to the same other points”
[42]. An example of cohesion is shown in Figure 8. The more cohesive relationships
are shown with thicker black lines, while the less cohesive relationships are shown
with thin lines. This might correspond with higher weights associated with the more
cohesive pairs in a weighted network.
1 2
3
4 5
76
Figure 8. Cohesion Example
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Figure 9 shows a network where all relationships are equivalent, which is the case for
all unweighted networks.
1 2
3
4 5
76
Figure 9. Equivalence Example
Redundancy by structural equivalence comes from similar connections to other ac-
tors. Burt identifies that two structurally equivalent actors are privy to the same
information. The difference between the two types of redundancy stems from the
difference between direct and indirect relationships. A competitive advantage exists
for actors that fill these holes [41].
The first measure identified as a part of structural hole analysis is the efficiency
of a certain ego, or the actor of interest, within a network. This is a measure of the
overall redundancy in which an ego is involved. The higher the efficiency of the ego,
the less its neighbors are also each other’s neighbors. Higher degree egos with low
efficiency provide the same informational benefits as lower degree egos with the same
efficiency. Figure 9 shows a network where each node has the same efficiency. No
neighbors of any node are connected. The efficiency of a community could affect the
amount of risk involved in placing a new actor amongst the current network actors,
similar to the extent to which a community functions, as explained in Section 2.3.
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Effective Size and Efficiency.
Borgatti expresses Burt’s efficiency measure in three parts, redundancy, effective size,
and total size [37]. Redundancy, ri, is shown in Equation 12a and represents the
contacts of the ego that are also contacts of each other. Effective size, si, is shown in
Equation 12b and expresses the difference between the amount of redundancies and
total relationships for an ego, which is total size. Total size, di is the degree of ego i
as explained in section 2.2. It is important to note that the matrix A still represents
the connections in the network and is symmetric and binary based on Borgatti’s
assumption of a connected, unweighted, undirected network. Aij then represents the
connection between actor i and j, when i 6= j. When i = j the value is 0. These
assumptions result in the equations for redundancy, effective size, and efficiency [37].
ri =
∑
j
∑
k
AikAkj
di
∀ i : (i, j) ∈ A (12a)
si = di − ri (12b)
ei =
si
di
(12c)
When Borgatti’s initial assumption drops, and A is no longer symmetric and binary,
the calculations for si change immensely as shown in Equation 13 [37].
si =
∑
j
[1−
∑
q
piqmjq] ∀ q 6= i, j (13a)
piq =
Aiq + Aqi∑
j(Aij + Aji)
∀ i 6= j (13b)
mjq =
Ajq + Aqj
maxk(Ajk + Akj)
∀ j 6= k (13c)
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piq is the ith, qth entry in the row-stochastic matrix P, which has weighted entries
based on the ties of each node. The matrix P for the example network is shown in
Figure 10. mjq becomes Ajq in an unweighted, undirected network.

0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0
1.0 0 0 0 0 0
0.33 0 0 0.33 0 0.33
0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.25
0 0 0 1.0 0 0
0 0 0.50 0.50 0 0

Figure 10. Example Row-Stochastic Matrix
The effective size and efficiencies of the example network in Figure 2 are shown in
Table 6.
Table 6. Example Network Structural Holes Measures
Node Effective Size Efficiency
1 2.3333 0.7778
2 1.0000 1.0000
3 1.6667 0.5556
4 3.0000 0.7500
5 1.0000 1.0000
6 1.0000 0.5000
The highest efficiency occurs with nodes two and five, which have degree one. This
is a trivial find. However, node one has an efficiency of 0.77 and has more than
degree one. This means 77% of this nodes neighbors are not connected to each other,
resulting in a non-redundant structure, where each relationship means more because
node one fills a structural hole.
Structural Hole Constraint Measures.
The two final parts of Burt’s structural holes measures include network constraint and
indirect constraint. Network constraint describes brokerage opportunities. Specifi-
cally, it “measures the extent to which a manager’s time and energy are concentrated
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in a single group of interconnected colleagues” [41]. This constraint value is made up
of three parts, which Burt identifies as C-size, C-density, and C-hierarchy. Indirect
constraint however is the “average network constraint on ego’s direct contacts” [41].
The higher the constraint, the lower the access to structural holes [37].
2.5 Network Functionality
Network functionality and its associated measures attempt to describe the network
in its entirety, based on the characteristics of the individual nodes. While networks
are classified into three different types: scale free, random, and small world, networks
of the same type can have significantly different functionality.
Geodesic Distance.
The first functionality measure involves the idea of geodesic distance, or the shortest
path, dij, from node i to node j . The geodesic distance from one vertex to another
directly effects network communication. Network functionality then is the speed of
this communication. Natural disaster response efforts benefit from a smaller average
geodesic, whereas network interdiction benefits from increasing the average geodesic
distance as much as possible. Interdiction techniques might also benefit from an
decrease in average geodesic distance given the travel of misinformation across the
network.
Holme and Kim [43] advocate the use of the average geodesic distance, `, to de-
termine the overall functionality of a network, shown in Equation 14a. Equation 14b
allows for real values to occur when analyzing disconnected graphs, due to the fact
that the lack of a path between any two nodes results in an infinite path length when
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using Equation 14a.
` =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i
∑
j
dij (14a)
`−1 =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i
∑
j
1
dij
(14b)
When using Equation 14b, the higher the value of `−1, the higher the functionality of
the network. For the network in Figure 2, the average geodesic distance ` is 1.6667,
while `−1 is 0.7111. These values show the relatively high speed of travel for this
extremely small network.
Clustering Coefficients.
While the idea of modularity, explained in Section 2.3, is a full network based measure,
clustering coefficients can determine the density of connections for an individual node
as well. The difference occurs between local and global clustering coefficients. The
local clustering coefficient for a node i is a value representing the extent to which a
node’s neighbors are connected to each other. For node i, this value, ci is calculated
using Equation 15.
ci =
ri
di − 1 (15)
di is the degree for node i and ri is defined as the redundancy of node i as shown in
Equation 12a.
With a local clustering coefficient for each node in the network, a global cluster-
ing coefficient can be calculated. Watts and Strogatz provide a measure of this value
shown in Equation 16a that is different than Newman’s definition, shown in Equation
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16b.
C =
1
n
n∑
i
Ci (16a)
C =
# of triangles× 3
# of connected triples
(16b)
Newman identifies that the Equation 16a is dominated by lower degree nodes, and
can give an inaccurate description of the overall network, but is more widely used
because of its earlier inception.
Both the local and global clustering coefficients could be very beneficial for node
insertion analysis from an individual and complete network standpoint. The higher
a local clustering value for a given node, the more redundant the relationships are,
and the riskier it might be to successfully implement an insertion at that point. In
addition the change in the global clustering value once a node is inserted could also
be used as a risk measure. It is important to note that local clustering is negatively
correlated with the efficiency measure mentioned in Section 2.4.
The local clustering coefficients of the network in Figure 2 are shown in Table 7.
The global clustering coefficient using Equation 16a is 0.3889, which means that on
average, 38.89% of a node’s neighbors are connected to each other.
Table 7. Example Network Local Clustering Values
Node Value
1 0.3333
2 0.0
3 0.6667
4 0.3333
5 0.0
6 1.0000
Node 6 has the highest local clustering because each of its neighbors are connected to
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each other, whereas node 4 has a lower local clustering value because only two of the
possible six connections of its neighbors are present in the network. It is important
to note that a nodes local clustering value means nothing unless taken into account
with its overall degree.
Laplacian Centrality.
Laplacian centrality is a measure introduced in 2013 as an extension of Gutman’s
work with Laplacian energy [44]. Specifically stated in Qi et al. [45], Laplacian energy
reflects the internal connectivity of a network and is based off of the graph Laplacian,
L, shown in Equation 17. Because the Laplacian centrality can be calculated using the
difference in structural characteristics, specifically based on the removal of a node,
this measure is an induced measure and provides a total centrality for a removed
entity.
L = D−A (17)
D =

d1 0 · · · · · ·
0 d2 0 · · ·
... 0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . dn
 (18)
D is defined as the degree matrix, shown in Equation 18, where each di is the degree
of node i, and A is the adjacency matrix for a graph G [46]. The Laplacian energy
of a graph is defined in Equation 19a with λi representing the ith eigenvalue of the
graph Laplacian. The initial derivation of Laplacian energy was made by Lazic´ and
is shown in Equation 19b, followed by the simplification shown in Equation 19b [47].
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EL(G) =
n∑
i=1
λ2i (19a)
EL(G) =
n∑
i=1
d2i + di (19b)
Equation 19a is computationally expensive when large networks are used due to the
computational requirements involved in finding the eigenvalues of the Laplacian.
Laplacian centrality relates to the change in connectivity; the difference between a
graph’s current energy and the energy when a vertex, i, is removed [45]. Qi goes from
the definition of Laplacian energy in Lazic´ [47] to a related definition of Laplacian
centrality, or the drop in Laplacian energy, LEi , following a node removal, defined in
Equation 20.
LEi = (∆E)i = d
2
i + di + 2
∑
vj∈N(i)
dj (20)
N(i) is the set of adjacent vertices of vertex i in the graph G. di is then the degree of
node i in G. dj then is the degree of the node j, which is a neighbor of node i. When
applied to other well studied social networks, Laplacian Centrality seems to perform
well, while providing perspective on the intermediate structure of a network.
The Laplacian centralities for the example network in Figure 2 are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Example Network Laplacian Centralities
Node Laplacian Normalized
1 28 0.67
2 8 0.00
3 30 0.73
4 38 1.00
5 10 0.07
6 20 0.40
Nodes 3 and 4 have the highest Laplacian centralities with values of 30 and 38 re-
spectively.
2.6 Measure Stability
In the arena of SNA, there are countless measures used to determine influential actors,
network functionality, and clusterability. Guzman et al. studied twenty-five social
networks measures to determine the relationship between them [6]. The results from
the research are shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Guzman’s Network Measure Rank Correlations [6]
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Of the 25 measures tested, 14 were highly correlated, or had a correlation above 0.85,
with at least one other measure. However, when the measures outlined in section 2.2
were compared to each other, the correlations were very low. Eigenvector centrality
and closeness centrality for example, only had a correlation of 0.03. Betweenness and
closeness centralities have a correlation of 0.13. Degree centrality has the highest
correlation with the other measures at 0.59 with betweenness, 0.36 with closeness,
and 0.28 with eigenvector, but does not exceed to 0.85 threshold set by Guzman.
The correlations for the centrality measures outlined are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Centrality Measures Correlation Matrix
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector
Degree 1.0 0.36 0.59 0.28
Closeness 1.0 0.13 0.03
Betweenness 1.0 0.18
Eigenvector 1.0
This shows the measures deliver different information about the structure of the
network of interest and the roles or importance of the network actors. This result in-
dicates the four measures could be effective in determining separate objectives. This
possible correlation, or lack of, with other measures could be beneficial to the node
insertion analysis from a risk and benefit trade off perspective, as well as from a util-
ity perspective, shown in Section 2.8. It is important to have uncorrelated risks and
benefits in this analysis to achieve independent utilities for each node insertion possi-
bility. The previously mentioned Laplacian centrality is relatively new and therefore,
not a part of Guzman’s’ correlation analysis.
For larger networks the availability of alternative, more quickly calculated measures
is important and crucial for the creation of faster algorithms and heuristics. The
similarities are important to know from the node insertion risk and benefit point of
view as well. If two similar measures are used in the analysis, one to determine risk
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and the other to determine benefit, the values for each of these objectives could be
extremely correlated, resulting in inaccurate representations of the two objectives.
For this reason, the measures for each of these objectives need to be as uncorrelated
as possible.
2.7 Network Disruption
Previous research in SNA has dealt with the determination of key nodes and edges
within a network, along with the functionality of the network given the removal of this
node(s) or edge(s). It seems that these techniques could be leveraged to determine
either high risk or high benefit nodes for insertion as well.
Malik et al. [48] and Corley et al. [49] correlate a vital arc or node to be one
that the removal of which results in the largest increase in the shortest path from
node i to j. This includes algorithms to determine the k most vital arcs, which is
much more difficult than finding the single most vital arc, especially when there is
not a designated source or sink node (which is the case for most social networks).
Malik et al.’s algorithm solves in O(m+n log n) time where m is the number of arcs
and n is the number of nodes [50].
With the assumption of an unweighted, undirected network, the k most vital arcs
become trivial because each arc is weighted the same. However, there could be arcs
or nodes where their removal results in a huge detour for travel to a certain node,
more so than the use of triad in the network. This might happen when the redun-
dancy of a node is low.
Other research has dealt with the removal of arcs and nodes not corresponding to
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an increase in a specific shortest path, but with the separation of nodes into multi-
ple components, known as the isolation set problem. First introduced by Bellmore
in 1970 [51], the purpose behind this problem is to eliminate arcs between nodes of
interest, or distinguished sets, effectively isolating them from the other components
within a network, with a minimum cost objective.
Herbranson [5] extended the original formulation to include costs of resources to cut
arcs, in addition to the inclusion to both vertex cut-sets and vertex-edge cut-sets as
possible solutions. Partial isolation sets are cuts that do not completely separate the
distinguished sets, but isolate them to a certain percentage, Pi [5]. A distinguished
set is the collection of nodes that a decision maker wishes to isolate from each other.
Herbranson’s isolation set solution, with distinguished sets {{2,4},{6,7,8},{10,17,16}}
is shown in Figure 11. In Figure 11, the isolations set solution shows the separation
of nodes two and four from nodes six, seven, and eight.
Figure 11. Herbranson Isolation Set Solution [5]
By applying isolation set techniques to node insertion, recommendations can be made
with the future disruption of the network in mind, and does not limit the analysis to
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the benefit or risk of information gathering.
2.8 Risk and Benefit Within Networks
While the overall functionality of a network can be calculated using the measures
previously provided, the determination of the importance of an actor is a much more
difficult task, and is much of the subject of this research. Bonacich identified early
on that the importance of overall actors cannot be based on simple measures, but
necessitates the use of families of measures [31]. While different in application from
Bonacich, the work of Jackson and Wolinsky [52] added to this idea by applying
utility to each individual node based on geodesic paths and costs of maintenance for
relationships. The main purpose behind the research was to determine the overall
utility of possible connections in the network, which is explained sufficiently in Section
2.10. The utility function developed is shown in Equation 21 for each node i.
ui(g) = wii +
∑
j 6=i
δdijwij −
∑
j
cij (21)
wii is the weight of a node in a network; δ is the benefit value of a connection within
the range [0, 1] and dij is the length of the shortest path from node i to node j and
wij is the weight of a connection from node i to node j, or its “intrinsic value” [52].
Jackson and Wolinsky maintain that cij is the overall cost of maintaining arc (i, j)
and is assumed to be nonnegative. They also apply this utility to the overall stability
of networks, identifying how networks will change based upon the utility of an ego
and the actors around it. This topic is explained in Section 2.10.
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2.9 Clandestine Networks
The ideas mentioned in previous sections make an important assumption in order to
provide seemingly valuable information for analysts. Early work in social networks
assumed perfect information of the network connections, which includes no missing
edges and no missing actors. Clandestine networks, or networks where the arcs and
nodes are not known with 100 percent certainty, no longer make this assumption,
but provide a network that is not assumed to be perfect. There is an expectation
of missing information. Clandestine networks, or dark networks, include “terrorist
organizations, drug-trafficking rings, arms-smuggling operations, gang enterprises”,
but are not limited to just criminal organizations [53]. The study of these networks,
where the actors involved are actively trying to avoid detection, allows for a higher
degree of fidelity within analysis, in addition to allowing for measure stability analysis
given a possible alternative network reality.
However, imperfect information about a network could result in inaccurate conclu-
sions that might be detrimental to the assets that organizations have inserted because
of the analysis. Therefore, it is important to include the possibility of having incorrect
and imperfect networks into node insertion analysis.
Carley et al. [20] identifies the dangers involved in networks with uncertainty from a
quantitative standpoint. After finding the “key actors” of an uncertain network, and
comparing to analysis with a full network with zero uncertainty, the results showed
problems with assuming 100% certainty within a network. For a network including
only 75% of the true nodes, the key actor was identified 65% of the time. Alterna-
tively, a network with 75% certainty on the edges only allows for correct key actor
classification approximately 57% of the time [20]. While the probabilities of finding
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the key actors are greater than random (or 1
N
where N is the total number of nodes),
it is significantly less than when the true network is known with 100% certainty. The
findings imply that network and actor measures are not robust to imperfect informa-
tion about the network.
Smith et al. in 2013 [54] introduced the idea of space-time threat propagation to
determine the probability of a threat from an actor given the identification of an ac-
tor. The actual detection of covert actors is outside of the scope of this analysis, but
it important to highlight the problems that could occur with clandestine networks
and how these are being addressed regardless.
2.10 Dynamic Networks
When dealing with terrorist networks, a simplifying assumption is that the current
network remains the same for an extended amount of time is often used. This sim-
plification degrades the fidelity of SNA immensely because of the inherently cellular
and dynamic nature of clandestine networks. When this assumption is relaxed, the
analysis focuses on how influences and interdictions of a network will affect its struc-
ture, specifically the connections between actors. Carley identifies events like death,
promotion, recruitment, innovation, goal changes, and acquisitions as reasons for a
change in the networks, but these are by no means all-encompassing [55].
Jackson and Wolinsky [52] also attempt to describe possible changes based on the
utility of the possible connections, which is described in Section 2.8. Actors within a
network will create connections based on a mutual benefit, or a “pairwise stability”,
between them [52]. It is important to note that when a network attempts to become
more stable, it does not necessarily reach the most stable structure, but will reach an
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overall higher utility structure based on having pairwise stability.
The dynamic nature of terrorist networks adds another dimension to node inser-
tion analysis, specifically the time aspect. However, it also allows for more precise
recommendations. If the dynamics of networks are taken into account, and predicted
with a relatively high amount of certainty, a node insertion can be recommended not
only upon an actor, with a certain relationship, but also at a specific time, to take
advantage of a weakened or vulnerable state within the network.
While the proactive node insertion is important, also crucial is the predicted effect
an insertion will have on a network following the implementation. If relationships or
the network functionality changes drastically because of an insertion, it is likely that
course of action could be detrimental to government and/or military interests as well
as the covert operative to be inserted.
2.11 Literature Review Summary
This chapter outlined previous works crucial to this research. This included network
type, centrality measures, network functionality, community analysis, and introduc-
tions to clandestine and dynamic networks.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
The following methodology describes the application of the various Social Network
Analysis (SNA) measures described in Chapter 2, ultimately to deliver recommenda-
tions for future node insertion operations. Using a weighted additive model approach
(WAM), these metrics are combined, organized by benefit and risk, and weighted
based on decision-maker (DM) input. This is an extension of the Jackson-Wolinsky
model for node utility [52], introduced in Section 2.8.
Section 3.2 outlines the notation used for the networks used in addition to the mea-
sures applied. Section 3.3 extends the work of Qi et al. with Laplacian centrality to
the node insertion problem. Section 3.4 outlines a specific model for node insertion
while Section 3.5 applies this model to an small overt network. Section 3.6 then out-
lines an extension of the specific model from Section 3.4 to a general form for the node
insertion problem. Section 3.7 then applies the specific methodology to the Zachary
Karate Club Network, a well known and well used network in SNA.
Figure 12 shows the process flow for this analysis; this chapter explains the fam-
ily of measures portion of the chart.
44
Figure 12. Process Flow
This methodology begins with identifying a single network for analysis, which in-
cludes real-world social networks. The next level shows the definition of both risk
and benefit, which are decomposed into a collection of local and global centrality cri-
teria. The risks and benefits used can differ within each application of node insertion,
specifically to provide a higher recommendation fidelity based on the node insertion
purposes.
Following the identification of risks, benefits, and weights for each measure, the WAM
is applied to a social network of interest with various characteristics, particularly net-
work structure. Results from this are collected in an attempt to understand the effects
of different characteristics of the network on the optimal solution to the node inser-
tion problem. The primary focus of the research is on the analysis of overt networks,
both scale free and small world. These structure types align to networks found most
commonly in SNA. The final step in the analysis deals with sensitivity parameters
such as the inherent cost of adding an arc to an inserted node, and subject-matter
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expert (SME) node weighting. The pruned process flow specific to this analysis is
shown in Figure 18.
Figure 13. Pruned Process Flow
The final step is to deliver node insertion recommendations for the network; a portfolio
of options for a DM to consider.
3.2 Notation
Each graph of interest is defined by G = (V,E). For the purposes of this research,
the terms “node” and “vertex” are used interchangeably. The same occurs with the
terms “edge” and “arc”. V is the set of all nodes in G, V = {v1, v2, ..., vn}, where vi
represents node i. E is the set of all arcs in G, E = {a12, a23, ..., aij}. aij is the arc
that connects nodes vi and vj such that aij ∈ E.
Node insertion scenario j, which includes the set of nodes involved with insertion
j, is defined as xj such that xj ⊆ V . vxj is the inserted node for scenario xj. Any
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arc involved in an insertion scenario is designated as axj, where a relationship exists
between the inserted node vxj and vj. G
∗
xj
= (V ∗xj , E
∗
xj
) where V ∗xj = V ∪ vxj and
E∗xj = E ∪Exj , where Exj is the set of arcs associated with scenario xj and Exj 6= Ø.
With this, there must be at least one relationship for the inserted node vxj .
3.3 Laplacian Energy Applied to Node Insertion
In Section 2.5 Laplacian centrality is defined as the drop in energy that results when a
node is “deactivated” within network G [45]. In order to capture this drop in energy
Qi et al. [45] uses Equation 20, which is extended to the node insertion problem
and the creation of a graph G∗xj . If a graph G
∗
xj
is created, where G∗xj is the graph
which includes a node insertion scenario xj and G ⊂ G∗xj , then it can be shown that
the EL(G) < EL(G
∗
xj
) by applying the proof in Lazic´ [47]. The change in Laplacian
energy then is the Laplacian centrality of vxj in G
∗
xj
, defined as Lxj . With this, the
work of Qi et al. [45] can be extended to the building of networks and the activation
of nodes, not just node removal, while still using the original equation provided. This
allows for the elicitation of the importance of a node directly from the network itself,
based on an intermediate network measure.
An example graph G∗xj , created from the network G shown in Figure 2, is shown
in Figure 14 where vxj is the inserted node associated with scenario xj.
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Figure 14. Example G∗
For the inserted node in Figure 14 the degree is two, with the sum of the degrees
of its neighbors equaling five. With this, the energy generated from adding a node
with connections to v5 and v6 results in lxj = 16, calculated using Equation 20. This
follows because EL(G) = 54 and EL(G
∗
xj
) = 70.
3.4 Specific Node Insertion Model
For this analysis, there are two possible node insertion purposes, which are intelligence
collection and future network disruption. In order to complete the different objectives
demanded by these purposes the benefits and risks associated with each are inherently
different. Table 11 shows the different purposes, along with associated benefits and
risks. The focus of this research is information gathering.
Table 11. Node Insertion Purposes
Risk Benefit
Information Gathering Min Closeness vi ∈ xj Max Laplacian Centrality vxj
Min ∆M Max Degree vi ∈ xj
Min Inherent Costs
P
u
rp
os
e
Future Network Disruption Min Laplacian Centrality vi Max Closeness vxj
Min Degree vi ∈ xj Max ∆M
Min Inherent Costs
Using the Laplacian centrality applied in Section 3.3 the specific WAM for this anal-
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ysis can be formulated. This is shown in Equation 22 and corresponds to a focus on
information gathering.
Uxj = wBBxj − wRRxj ∀ j (22a)
φi = wsdi + (1− ws)pi (22b)
Bxj = w1Lxj + w2
n∑
i∈xj
φi ∀ j (22c)
Rxj = w3mxj +
n∑
i∈xj
w4Ci + w5zxj ∀ j (22d)
Uxj then is the overall utility for xj. Bxj is the benefit value for xj, while Rxj is the
risk value for xj. φi is the individual node bias which is made up the degree di for
vi and the SME rating, pi, for vi, which are both normalized. The weight ws defines
the importance of both of these measures. Lxj , the change in Laplacian energy, is
as defined previously with w1 as its associated weight, and w2 as the weight of the
summed individual node biases. Different weighting corresponds to both differing
measure emphasis, levels of risk aversion, and competing node insertion purposes
(intelligence collection or future network disruption). mxj is defined as the absolute
change in assortative mixing occurring between G and G∗xj , the calculation for which
is shown with Equation 24.
M(G) is the assortative mixing by degree for a graph G while M(G∗xj) is the as-
sortative mixing by degree for G∗xj , previously described in Section 2.3. Ci is this
closeness of vi with w3 and w4 are defined as the weights for mxj and Ci respectively.
zxj is the inherent cost of creating xj and is shown in Equation 23 where c is some
fixed cost parameter and |Exj | is the cardinality of the edges added in scenario xj.
zxj = |Exj |c (23)
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mxj = |M(G∗xj)−M(G)| (24)
Each of the values calculated for each xj will be normalized using Equation 25.
Normalized si =
si −min(S)
max(S)−min(S) (25)
S is the set of all scores si. This normalization technique is used because we are only
concerned with the relative risks and benefits between each insertion scenario, not an
actual cost or profit for each of these measures.
To keep a two-level normalization within the network model, the only restriction
on the weights is that they sum to one within each level. The first level of normal-
ization occurs with the Laplacian centrality for each scenario xj. The second level
of normalization occurs with total benefit, which includes the normalized Laplacian
centrality and the summation of the degree and SME weighting. On the risk side,
the first level of normalization occurs with the closeness values for graph G and the
change in assortative mixing for each insertion scenario. The second level includes
the normalization of the summation of normalized closeness, assortative mixing, and
non-normalized inherent costs. With this, the weights on the degree and SME input
should sum to one. The weights on the individual node bias and Laplacian centrality,
w1 and w2 respectfully, should also sum to one. The same should occur with weights
w3, w4, and w5.
With each of these benefits and risks, the specific model created includes a local
measure (degree), intermediate measure (Laplacian centrality), global measure (close-
ness), and a full network measure (assortative mixing), which allows for the true
structure of the network to be captured within each dimension. The utility of each
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node insertion strategy for this model is then described with Equation 26.
Uxj =
benefit︷ ︸︸ ︷
degree︸ ︷︷ ︸
local
+ Laplacian︸ ︷︷ ︸
intermediate
−
risk︷ ︸︸ ︷
closeness︸ ︷︷ ︸
global
−∆assortivity︸ ︷︷ ︸
full network
−cost (26)
Degree and Laplacian centrality were used as benefits because of the focus on infor-
mation collection within this analysis. A number of contacts and high importance of
indirect contacts directly affects the amount and strength of information that could
flow through an inserted node. Laplacian centrality also accounts for communities
which might exist within a network. With that being said, residing along the quickest
lines of communication could make an inserted operative vulnerable, which increases
risk when inserting. For this reason, closeness centrality was designated as a risk mea-
sure. Assortivity was also used as risk because it captures the types of connections
made in a network. If an operative attempts to make irregular connections within a
network, it could raise suspicion from within the network and increase overall risk.
3.5 Methodology Applied To Example Network
In order to thoroughly explain the proposed methodology, the example network pre-
viously shown in Figure 2 is used as the network of interest. The different steps in
methodology will be implemented to this network, ultimately resulting in the identi-
fication of a portfolio of possible node insertion scenarios.
The analysis begins with the elicitation of weights for each vi. As defined previously,
the weights for each node are made up of structural characteristics and SME input.
The characteristic of focus for this analysis is the degree of vi. The total weights for
each vi are a weighted combination of the normalized degrees and normalized SME
weights. These values, along with the SME weights, are shown in Table 12. For this
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example, degree and SME input are equally weighted.
Table 12. Individual Node Weights
Node Degree Normalized Degree SME Weight Normalized SME Total Bias
1 3 0.667 0.1190 0.0000 0.1772
2 1 0.000 0.4984 0.4513 0.0000
3 3 0.667 0.9597 1.0000 1.0000
4 4 1.000 0.3404 0.2634 0.6682
5 1 0.000 0.5853 0.5547 0.0850
6 2 0.333 0.2238 0.1247 0.0055
Each xj will receive an additional weight in benefit given which nodes make up the
insertion scenario. For example, x3 would receive an additional benefit of 1.0 because
the inserted node forms a relationship with v3, while x2 would receive no additional
benefit because the inserted node forms a relationship with v2 which has no individual
bias.
An assumption exists on the actual insertion of nodes. Operationally, it would be
unrealistic to attempt to create relationships with every node within a large network.
The risk involved in creating this large number of relationships and the risk involved
with remaining inconspicuous while maintaining them is extremely large. Knowing
this, there is a limit on the number of relationships that can be created for an inserted
node. The assumption then is that the maximum number of relationships that can
be added is a function of the total number of nodes within the network.
For this methodology, the function chosen to limit the number of relationships possible
for each xj is the average degree of graph G. If more than this number of relationships
is added, the inserted node could attract a large amount of suspicion, which would
dramatically increase the overall risk . This functions also aids in limiting the design
space to a tractable level.
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Every possible insertion scenario is combined into the matrix X, called the edge
addition matrix. For the original graph G, in Figure 2 X is shown in Equation 27 for
the addition of up to two arcs, resulting in twenty-one possible scenarios.
X =
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6

1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 1 0 0 0 0
8 1 0 1 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 1 0 0
10 1 0 0 0 1 0
11 1 0 0 0 0 1
12 0 1 1 0 0 0
13 0 1 0 1 0 0
14 0 1 0 0 1 0
15 0 1 0 0 0 1
16 0 0 1 1 0 0
17 0 0 1 0 1 0
18 0 0 1 0 0 1
19 0 0 0 1 1 0
20 0 0 0 1 0 1
21 0 0 0 0 1 1
(27)
Each column in the matrix X represents a node in G, and each row represents a
different xj. The presence of a one in a specific row is the presence of axi in G
∗
xj
.
Using X, a G∗xj is then created for each xj, and the Laplacian centrality of vxj in each
G∗xj is calculated using Equation 20.
The Laplacian centralities for each vxj are shown in Table 13, along with their nor-
malized values, calculated using Equation 25.
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Table 13. Laplacian Centralities of vxj
xj Laplacian Normalized
1 10 0.22
2 6 0.00
3 10 0.22
4 12 0.33
5 6 0.00
6 8 0.11
7 18 0.67
8 22 0.89
9 24 1.00
10 18 0.67
11 20 0.78
12 18 0.67
13 20 0.78
14 14 0.44
15 16 0.56
16 24 1.00
17 18 0.67
18 20 0.78
19 20 0.78
20 22 0.89
21 16 0.56
Scenarios x9 and x16 exhibit the highest Laplacian centralities. This corresponds to
relationships with v1 and v4 for scenario x9 and v3 and v4 for scenario x16. It is also
important to note that scenarios x2 and x5, which include relationships with v2 and
v5 respectively, provide the lowest benefit.
Of note in these results is the Laplacian centrality for scenarios x9 and x16 exceeds
the Laplacian centrality of the sum of their parts. For example, scenario x16 includes
relationships with v3 and v4, which includes ax3 and ax4, for a Laplacian centrality of
24. If two nodes are inserted, one with a single relationship with v3 and the other with
a single relationship to v4, their combined Laplacian centrality is 22. This non-linear
increase will always occur with Laplacian centrality due to the d2i term in the Lapla-
cian centrality calculation, shown in Equation 20. With this, Lxj >
∑
Li ∀i ∈ xj.
Figure 15 provides the network diagram for this result. A similar relationship is found
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with closeness. As multiple relationships are created with an inserted node, the pos-
sibility of creating new shortest paths also exists. This creates a relationship in which
Cxj ≥
∑
Ci ∀i ∈ xj. It is not a strict inequality because the addition of multiple
arcs does not necessarily change the shortest path.
1
2 3
4
5
6
x16x4
x3
Figure 15. Laplacian Insertion Property
To determine the risk of an insertion scenario, we first define an inherent cost of cre-
ating a relationship, zxj . This is similar to the cij identified by Jackson and Wolinsky
[52], and originally described in Section 2.8, but only captures the action of creating
axi and not the risk associated with that node based on the structure of the network.
This is accomplished using Equation 23 previously shown in Section 3.4.
For the example network an inherent cost of 0.2 is used for each added relation-
ship. Changing the inherent cost for the addition of an arc would only shift the
highest utility insertion strategies to those involving a higher or lower number of arcs
depending on whether or not the change decreases or increases respectively. The
inherent cost is not normalized because it remains on the same scale as the other
measures, unlike closeness and betweenness which lie on different scales. It is impor-
tant to remember that the inherent costs can exceed one depending on the number
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of relationships added for a particular xj.
The second step of the risk formulation is the calculation of closeness centrality for
every node in G. Since this calculation involves the identification of all shortest paths
it provides huge computational load to the analysis, especially with large networks.
However, the risk is determined prior to insertion, so only the closeness values of the
nodes in G need to be calculated, not the closeness of each node in every G∗xj . Equa-
tion 6a is used to calculate the closeness, which assumes a connected graph. For the
example network the closeness values, originally shown in Table 2, are reproduced in
Table 14 along with the normalized values, calculated using Equation 25.
Table 14. Example Network Closeness Centralities
Node Closeness Normalized
1 0.143 0.686
2 0.091 0.000
3 0.143 0.686
4 0.167 1.000
5 0.100 0.120
6 0.111 0.267
v4 has the highest closeness centrality but is closely followed by v1 and v3. These also
happen to be the nodes that result in the largest Laplacian centrality with scenarios
x9 and x16. These costs are added to the total risk for insertion scenario xj based on
the set of nodes involved in xj.
The third step in determining cost is to find the change in the assortivity coeffi-
cient occurring between G and G∗xj calculated using Equations 11 and 24, which
calculates degree assortivity. Given this differentiation, the groups for each node are
purely made up by the degrees of each of the nodes. Following the creation of G∗xj ,
the group that vxj falls into is also determined. The absolute change in assortative
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mixing from G to each G∗xj is shown in Table 15, and defined as ηxj .
Table 15. ∆ Assortative Mixing from G to G∗xj
xj mxj Normalized
1 0.087 0.191
2 0.258 0.584
3 0.004 0.000
4 0.142 0.316
5 0.392 0.890
6 0.188 0.424
7 0.125 0.278
8 0.013 0.021
9 0.130 0.289
10 0.125 0.278
11 0.004 0.001
12 0.125 0.278
13 0.019 0.036
14 0.378 0.860
15 0.270 0.610
16 0.071 0.154
17 0.236 0.533
18 0.221 0.498
19 0.115 0.255
20 0.016 0.027
21 0.439 1.000
Scenarios x21, x5, and x14 and have the highest change in assortative mixing, which
indicates the highest possible risk values for this measure.
In order to remove the possibility of inherent weighting between risks and benefits
just based on the scale of values, the benefits and risks are normalized using unity
based normalization from Equation 25. The total benefit for each is the summation of
each xj’s Laplacian centrality value and each individual node weight. The total risk
is the summation of inherent cost for xj, the closeness for each node that xj involves,
and the change in assortative mixing that occurs with xj. The normalized values are
shown in Table 16.
57
Table 16. Benefits and Risks Associated With vxj
xj Benefit Risk
1 0.164 0.179
2 0.000 0.153
3 0.411 0.000
4 0.367 0.444
5 0.025 0.488
6 0.057 0.200
7 0.386 0.448
8 0.797 0.601
9 0.753 1.000
10 0.412 0.497
11 0.444 0.385
12 0.633 0.448
13 0.589 0.368
14 0.248 0.647
15 0.279 0.561
16 1.000 0.874
17 0.659 0.736
18 0.690 0.851
19 0.615 0.623
20 0.646 0.557
21 0.305 0.975
The highest benefit comes from scenario x16, which includes v3 and v4. The lowest
risk comes from scenario x3, which also has a moderate benefit of 0.411. The highest
risk comes from scenario x9, with a total benefit of 0.753.
In order to calculate the utility for each xj, Equation 28a is used, where wB =
wR = 0.5. These utilities are shown in Table 17.
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Table 17. Utility For Each xj
xj Utility
1 -0.007
2 -0.076
3 0.205
4 -0.039
5 -0.231
6 -0.071
7 -0.031
8 0.098
9 -0.123
10 -0.042
11 0.029
12 0.093
13 0.110
14 -0.200
15 -0.141
16 0.063
17 -0.038
18 -0.080
19 -0.004
20 0.044
21 -0.335
The optimal scenario is x3 which includes only v3 with a total utility of 0.205. In total
there are seven scenarios where the benefits outweigh the risk, resulting in a positive
utility for the scenario. These are shown in Table 18, which describes a portfolio
of the best node insertion scenarios, along with the nodes involved in each insertion
scenario.
Table 18. Example Network Node Insertion Portfolio
xj Nodes Utility
3 v3 0.205
13 v2, v4 0.110
8 v1, v3 0.098
12 v2, v3 0.093
16 v3, v4 0.063
20 v4, v6 0.044
11 v1, v6 0.029
A relationship with v3 is prominent in the top node insertion strategies, but a rela-
tionship with v2 appears in multiple strong strategies as well. This portfolio suggests
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a number of significantly different strategies to prepare for decision-maker input. The
third, and fourth strategies in the portfolio also seem to have similar utility values
suggesting they are essentially interchangeable, which allows for flexibility in the final
decision.
3.6 Generalized Model
While a specific model was used for this analysis, which included degree, Laplacian,
and closeness centralities, in addition to assortative mixing, a generalized method-
ology was also developed. Equation 28 shows the generalized form of the utility
function identified in Equation 22, which is an extension to Jackson and Wolinsky’s
model [52], originally shown in Equation 21.
Uxj = wBBxj − wRRxj ∀ j (28a)
φi =
S∑
s
wsb
i
s ∀ i (28b)
Bxj = wb
n∑
i∈xj
φi + wc
K∑
k
wkγ
xj
k ∀ j (28c)
Rxj =
L∑
l
wlη
xj
l ∀ j (28d)
The definitions of each of these variables correspond to the original definitions outlined
in the specific WAM shown in Section 3.4, but are not limited to degree, Laplacian
centrality, closeness, or assortative mixing but can follow any function that the de-
cision maker designates as a risk or a benefit. Individual benefit and risk values are
calculated to allow for assessment of trade-offs within the decision maker’s (DM) de-
cision space. The overall utility is used for the direct comparison of node insertion
scenarios and ultimately allows for the creation of a prioritized list of these scenarios.
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3.7 Methodology Applied to Zachary’s Karate Club Network
One well known social network comes from Zachary 1977 [56] and is a representa-
tion of the relationships between members of a dissolved karate club, simply called
Zachary’s Karate Club Network (ZKCN). Originally collected between 1970 and 1972
for the purpose of studying “fission” in small networks from a anthropology perspec-
tive, this network has become widely used in social network research [56]. Using
the specific WAM outlined in Section 3.4 a portfolio of node insertion strategies for
this network will be identified and presented to further demonstrate the methodology.
The parameters and weighting for the node insertion analysis of the ZKCN remain the
same as for the analysis of the example network, with the exception of the individual
node bias. A random SME weighting scheme was used to create the individual node
bias within the network and is shown in Table 19. The total individual node bias
with the inclusion of the normalized degree of each node is shown in Table 20.
Table 19. ZKCN SME Weighting
Node Weight Normalized Node Weight Normalized
1 0.148 0.149 18 0.228 0.230
2 0.055 0.055 19 0.498 0.503
3 0.851 0.859 20 0.901 0.910
4 0.561 0.566 21 0.575 0.580
5 0.930 0.939 22 0.845 0.854
6 0.697 0.704 23 0.739 0.746
7 0.583 0.588 24 0.586 0.592
8 0.815 0.824 25 0.247 0.249
9 0.879 0.888 26 0.666 0.673
10 0.989 0.999 27 0.083 0.084
11 0.001 0.000 28 0.626 0.632
12 0.865 0.874 29 0.661 0.667
13 0.613 0.619 30 0.730 0.737
14 0.990 1.000 31 0.891 0.900
15 0.528 0.533 32 0.982 0.992
16 0.480 0.484 33 0.769 0.777
17 0.801 0.809 34 0.581 0.587
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Table 20. Total Individual Node Bias for ZKCN
Node Degree Normalized Node Bias Normalized Node Degree Normalized Node Bias Normalized
1 16 0.938 0.543 0.657 18 2 0.063 0.146 0.114
2 9 0.500 0.278 0.294 19 2 0.063 0.283 0.301
3 10 0.563 0.711 0.887 20 3 0.125 0.517 0.622
4 6 0.313 0.439 0.515 21 2 0.063 0.321 0.354
5 3 0.125 0.532 0.642 22 2 0.063 0.458 0.541
6 4 0.188 0.446 0.524 23 2 0.063 0.404 0.467
7 4 0.188 0.388 0.445 24 5 0.250 0.421 0.490
8 4 0.188 0.506 0.606 25 3 0.125 0.187 0.170
9 5 0.250 0.569 0.693 26 3 0.125 0.399 0.460
10 2 0.063 0.531 0.640 27 2 0.063 0.073 0.015
11 3 0.125 0.063 0.000 28 4 0.188 0.410 0.475
12 1 0.000 0.437 0.512 29 3 0.125 0.396 0.457
13 2 0.063 0.341 0.380 30 4 0.188 0.462 0.547
14 5 0.250 0.625 0.769 31 4 0.188 0.544 0.658
15 2 0.063 0.298 0.322 32 6 0.313 0.652 0.807
16 2 0.063 0.273 0.288 33 12 0.688 0.732 0.916
17 2 0.063 0.436 0.511 34 17 1.000 0.794 1.000
When dealing with a small network, the evaluation of each possible node insertion
scenario is tractable. For a thirty node network, allowing up to three relationships to
be added, the number of combinations is 4,525, the calculation for which is shown in
Equation 29. (
30
1
)
+
(
30
2
)
+
(
30
3
)
= 30 + 435 + 4060 = 4525 (29)
As we allow for the inclusion of up to n relationships for an inserted node, the pos-
sibilities grow to over 1 billion possible relationship combinations. For a 1,000 node
network, the number of scenarios grows to nearly this magnitude after only three
possible relationships are allowed, and passes this threshold with the possibility of
four relationships. For this reason, it is not feasible to evaluate every potential node
scenario to gain an optimal solution. Instead, for the sake of having a tractable de-
cision space, the guarantee of optimality is sacrificed. To eliminate the possibility of
not finding an optimal solution in tractable time, we limit the number of relationships
within each xj in order to guarantee an optimal solution over each scenario investi-
gated.
The average degree for this network is 4.588, so the scope of this specific instance
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includes every contingency up to the creation of four relationships. With this speci-
fication there are 52,955 node insertion scenarios to evaluate.
The top node insertion scenario for this network is x5899, which includes a relationship
with three nodes: v17, v33 and v34. The total utility is 0.115, which is 0.227 greater
than the expected value of a random insertion, −0.1125, corresponding to a 201.9%
increase.
The portfolio for the top ten node insertion candidates is shown in Table 21.
Table 21. ZKCN Insertion Portfolio
xj Nodes Utility % ∆ Utility
5899 v17, v33, v34 0.1147 201.9%
31800 v6, v17, v33, v34 0.1133 200.7%
20810 v3, v17, v33, v34 0.1128 200.3%
20350 v3, v14, v33, v34 0.1125 200.0%
7404 v1, v3, v17, v34 0.1107 198.4%
50519 v17, v26, v33, v34 0.1097 197.5%
5439 v14, v33, v34 0.1094 197.2%
34725 v7, v17, v33, v34 0.1077 195.7%
21489 v3, v31, v33, v34 0.1076 195.6%
987 v1, v17, v34 0.1071 195.2%
v33 and v34 appear in each of the top ten node insertion scenarios except for x7404,
which only includes v33. v17 makes six appearances. It is noteworthy that the sec-
ond, third, and fourth scenarios in the portfolio, x20350, x20180, and x31800, each have
essentially the same utility. This allows for decision maker flexibility given that these
three scenarios include different nodes. A portfolio including the top candidates for
each number of possible relationships, up to four, is shown in Table 22.
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Table 22. ZKCN Insertion Portfolio by Number of Relationships
# Relationships xi Nodes Utility % ∆ Utility
1 3 v3 0.0802 171.3%
2 217 v6, v34 0.0946 184.1%
3 5899 v17, v33, v34 0.1147 201.9%
4 31800 v6, v17, v33, v34 0.1133 200.7%
According to Table 22 the utility of the top insertion candidates increased greatly
from the addition of only two arcs to three or four arcs added, but not a large change
occurred between three and four relationships for the insertion scenario.
The ratio between risk and benefit also gives insight for each of these scenarios.
These risk ratios, or the quotient between risk and benefit, for each of the top ten
insertion scenarios, are shown in Table 23.
Table 23. Risk Ratios for ZKCN Portfolio
xj Ratio (Rxj/Bxj)
5899 0.6334
987 0.6544
5439 0.6812
31800 0.7061
50519 0.7089
34725 0.7166
20810 0.7405
7404 0.7437
20350 0.7580
21489 0.7625
When comparing risk ratios, values above one mean risks outweigh benefits. Alterna-
tively, values below one mean benefits outweigh risks. Each of these scenarios has a
risk ratio below one, which corresponds to the results shown previously. The optimal
solution, scenario x5899, also has the lowest risk ratio, with value of 0.6334. The risk
for this insertion is 0.6334 times as large as the benefit. Equivalently, the benefit is
1.577 times as large as the risk.
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When comparing Tables 21 and 23 differences do exits. The tenth solution overall,
scenario x987, has the second lowest risk ratio, while scenario x21489 has the highest
risk ratio of the top ten scenarios.
It is also interesting to note that the top two insertion scenarios in terms of risk
ratio, are both insertions that only require three inserted relationships. The risk ra-
tio associated with the expected risk and expected benefit of a random insertion is
1.462, suggesting that the expected risk of a random insertion is 1.462 times as large
as the expected benefit of a random insertion.
For the top insertion scenario, x5899, both the Laplacian and closeness centralities,
along with their overall ranks, are shown in Table 24.
Table 24. ZKCN Benefit and Cost Comparison for x5899
Node Closeness Rank Laplacian Rank
17 0.3265 34 6 28
33 0.6152 4 156 3
34 0.6838 1 306 1
Figure 16 shows the plots of each node insertion scenario and their associated utility.
The average utility for the network is shown by the red line. The black line is
representative of zero utility. Because within this analysis benefit and utility were
equally weighted, any point above this line corresponds to a scenario with more benefit
than risk. It is important to note that there were a significantly higher amount of risky
scenarios than there were beneficial ones. Figure 16 also shows that multiple scenarios
separate themselves significantly from the group. These higher utility scenarios are
addressed in Table 21. The pattern in Figure 16 exists due to the sequencing of
MATLAB’s nchoosek function.
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Figure 16. ZKCN Utility Plot
Since risks and benefits were present in the analysis, it was important to make sure
these measures were uncorrelated. Figure 17 shows a Risk vs. Benefit plot for the
ZKCN utility values.
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Figure 17. ZKCN Risk vs. Benefit Plot with Pareto Frontier
As shown in Figure 17, there seems to be a slight upward trend in the data, sug-
gesting some slight correlation exists between the risk and benefit. Using the benefit
values as a response and the risk values as the independent variable within a linear
regression yielded a significant model. The R2 value was 0.0564 suggesting that just
over 5% of the variation within the risk values was captured by the model. While
risk was significant in determining benefit, the fit to the response was lacking.
The correlation between the measures was 0.24, which is just below 0.30, a thresh-
old considered significant in most social sciences. This significant relationship was
also dependent on the inherent costs of adding additional arcs because the Laplacian
centrality of an inserted node increases with the addition of more arcs, just as the
inherent costs increases with the addition of arcs. To control this, the risks and ben-
efit values were broken up by number of relationships. With this control added, the
results differed. Table 25 shows these correlation values.
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Table 25. Benefit and Risk Correlation by # of Inserted Relationships
Relationship # Correlation
1 -0.0566
2 -0.352
3 -0.264
4 -0.0637
This analysis initially applied the methodology to the ZKCN with equal weighting
benefit and risk. In order to assess the sensitivity of these weights, different weighting
schemes were also used. These different weighting schemes allowed for the Pareto
frontier to be established, which is also shown in Figure 17. Any red point in Figure
17 is a dominating insertion scenario, or one that is optimal for at least one weighting
scheme, which involves changing only the weights on benefit and risk, wB and wR
respectively. Both the scenarios associated with these points and their respective
weighting are shown in Table 26.
Table 26. wB and wR Sensitivity Analysis Results
xj wB wR
6 0.00 1.00
6 0.05 0.95
6 0.10 0.90
6 0.15 0.85
4 0.20 0.80
3 0.25 0.75
3 0.30 0.70
3 0.35 0.65
3 0.40 0.60
3 0.45 0.55
5899 0.50 0.50
20350 0.55 0.45
20350 0.60 0.40
20350 0.65 0.35
10895 0.70 0.30
7540 0.75 0.25
7540 0.80 0.20
7540 0.85 0.15
7540 0.90 0.10
7540 0.95 0.05
7540 1.00 0.00
Table 26 shows that certain solutions dominate for a large range of weighting schemes,
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suggesting more stable solutions. The optimal solution for equal weights appeared
only once, whereas scenario 7540 dominated from a benefit weight of 0.75 to a benefit
weight of 1.00. It is also interesting to note that for the equally weighted solution,
three relationships were added. For all other dominating scenarios, the optimal solu-
tion included either the lowest number of possible relationships, or the highest number
of possible relationships.
3.8 Methodology Summary
This chapter focuses on the explanation of both the specific and general utility mod-
els for node insertion. This includes the extension of Laplacian centrality to node
activation. The specific formulation was explained through application to an exam-
ple network. A secondary application to the ZKCN resulted in an optimal insertion
strategy and a portfolio of other high utility strategies for the decision-maker stage.
A Pareto frontier was generated to assess the sensitivity of the weights on the risk
and benefit portions of the methodology. The methodology provides marked improve-
ment in insertion scenario utility, from an information collection perspective, over a
random insertion.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the node insertion methodology presented in Chapter 3 is applied to
multiple networks of differing type, size, and structural characteristics. Section 4.2
outlines the experimentation plan in addition to describing the graph generation pro-
cess. Section 4.3 presents the results of the experimentation in addition to providing
robustness analysis. This process is reiterated in Figure 18.
Figure 18. Pruned Process Flow
4.2 Experimentation
In order to cover the different types of network structures, and even the subtle differ-
ences between networks of the same type, the experimentation plan shown in Table
27 was implemented. This experimentation plan served which, if any, of the different
network and node characteristics are crucial in determining the make-up of the best
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node insertion strategies. Ultimately this will determine the overall robustness of the
methodology outlined in Chapter 3 in dealing with networks of different structures
and characteristics.
Table 27. Node Insertion Pilot Experimentation Plan
Scale Free Nodes Exponent Replicates
30 2.2 2
30 2.8
200 2.2
200 2.8
Small World Nodes Rewiring Average Degree Replicates
30 0.10 2 2
30 0.25 2
200 0.10 4
200 0.25 4
For scale free networks the network size and exponent α are the only variables used
because they govern the extent to which a network follows scale free properties. For
small word networks, network size, rewiring probability and average degree are the
sole variables. While the rewiring probability is important for the generation of small
world networks, it is difficult to determine this probability from an operational small
world network. However, a larger the rewiring probability results in a network that
more closely resembles an Erdo¨s-Re´yni random graph, two of the characteristics of
which are a low global clustering coefficient and a low average local clustering. Be-
cause of their high negative correlation, this average local clustering value is used as
a proxy factor for the rewiring probability.
While the power law exponent can be calculated for a small world network, the
coefficient of variation (CV) is used as a proxy factor for the power law exponent.
CV is calculated using Equation 30. σ is the variance of degrees while µ is the average
degree.
CV =
σ
µ
(30)
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With these factors and levels a 22 + 23 full factorial experiment with two replicates
is used, resulting in a total of twenty-four experiments. These experiments consist of
graphs created using Morris’ Prescribed Node Degree, Connected Graph (PNDCG)
Algorithm [57] and a small world connected network generator, the code for which
is shown in Appendix A. Due to randomness, the exponent for each of the scale-free
graphs will differ, resulting in a semi-orthogonal experimentation plan. The charac-
teristics of each of these experiments are shown in Table 28.
The principal response for this analysis is the percent increase in utility gained from
using the optimal insertion strategy versus the expected utility gained from a ran-
dom insertion. Because of the qualitative nature for assessing possible undercover
insertions is most likely random, this response identifies the increase in information
collection potential resulting from the optimal insertion strategy. Using this response,
along with the characteristics of the network the responses were gathered from, a
regression model can be created to determine the significance of the different experi-
mentation factors in determining the utility of the top node insertion strategy.
Inherent cost remains at a level of 0.2 for the all experiments. In an additional
attempt to reduce noise within the experiments, the SME weights for the individual
nodes were held constant between networks of the same size. While this portion of
the bias remained constant, due to the randomness involved in the creation of these
networks, the degree of each of a network’s nodes were affected. This resulted in
different individual biases for each node overall, but kept the noise to a minimum.
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Table 28. Experiment Network Descriptions
Experiment # Network Type Nodes Edges Average LC Density Average Degree CV
1 1 30 49 0.2022 0.1126 3.3 1.0511
2 1 30 39 0.2364 0.0897 2.6 1.2959
3 1 30 45 0.1819 0.1034 3 1.2533
4 1 30 36 0.0112 0.0828 2.4 1.7322
5 1 200 300 0.0935 0.0151 3 1.8476
6 1 200 253 0.0849 0.0127 2.5 2.2108
7 1 200 357 0.1562 0.0179 3.6 2.0659
8 1 200 215 0.0349 0.0108 2.2 2.5333
9 2 30 30 0.0000 0.0690 2 0.2274
10 2 30 30 0.0000 0.0690 2 0.2936
11 2 30 30 0.0000 0.0690 2 0.2936
12 2 30 30 0.0000 0.0690 2 0.2274
13 2 30 60 0.4478 0.1379 4 0.0928
14 2 30 60 0.2978 0.1379 4 0.1970
15 2 30 60 0.4156 0.1379 4 0.1137
16 2 30 60 0.3000 0.1379 4 0.1970
17 2 200 200 0.0000 0.0101 2 0.1876
18 2 200 200 0.0000 0.0101 2 0.2879
19 2 200 200 0.0000 0.0101 2 0.1662
20 2 200 200 0.0108 0.0101 2 0.3325
21 2 200 400 0.4080 0.0201 4 0.1302
22 2 200 400 0.3203 0.0201 4 0.1772
23 2 200 400 0.4223 0.0201 4 0.1121
24 2 200 400 0.3243 0.0201 4 0.2036
Table 28 summarizes the different characteristics of the networks used for experimen-
tation. It is important to note that even networks of the same size and overall type
have differing characteristics. Experiments 17 and 18 for example are both scale free,
with 200 nodes, and densities of 0.0101, but differ in terms of their CV, suggesting
that the degree distributions do differ slightly. Even replicated networks, such as
experiments 1 and 3, resulted in different overall characteristics.
4.3 Analysis
For each of the experiments performed, the top insertion strategy, expected utility
value, top insertion utility value, and overall computation time were recorded. These
values are shown in Table 29 and Table 30. The results in Table 29 were found using
the parfor() parallel processing function in MATLAB on an Intel(R) Xeon E5-1620
3.6 GHz processor with eight cores and 32 GB memory. The final four experiments
involved the evaluation of 66,018,450 possible insertion scenarios, totaling over seventy
73
hours of computation time for each experiment on the machine used for experiments
1-20. For this reason a more powerful machine was used for experiments 21-24, which
allowed for data to be gathered in tractable time. The results in Table 30 were found
using a dual Intel Xeon E5-2650v2 workstation with 192 GB of RAM.
Table 29. Experimental Results: Experiments 1-20
Experiment Network Type Expected Utility Top Insertion Utility Utility ∆ % Utility ∆ # Arcs Comp Time (s) Comp Time (h)
1 1 -0.0694 0.1685 0.2379 343% 3 1.7954 0.0005
2 1 -0.1764 0.1722 0.3486 198% 1 0.3073 0.0001
3 1 -0.1429 0.1405 0.2834 198% 3 1.7269 0.0005
4 1 -0.2080 0.1860 0.3940 189% 2 0.3318 0.0001
5 1 -0.1406 0.2512 0.3918 279% 3 974.9646 0.2708
6 1 -0.2561 0.1444 0.4005 156% 2 18.5989 0.0052
7 1 -0.2496 0.1716 0.4213 169% 3 1158.9660 0.3219
8 1 -0.2074 0.2187 0.4261 205% 2 17.1319 0.0048
9 2 -0.0576 0.0969 0.1545 268% 2 0.4637 0.0001
10 2 0.0689 0.2174 0.1485 215% 2 0.4176 0.0001
11 2 -0.0163 0.1420 0.1583 972% 2 0.4314 0.0001
12 2 0.0429 0.2132 0.1702 396% 2 0.4545 0.0001
13 2 0.0836 0.2992 0.2156 258% 4 4.5680 0.0013
14 2 0.0157 0.1595 0.1438 914% 4 4.5612 0.0013
15 2 0.0879 0.2969 0.2090 238% 4 4.4112 0.0012
16 2 0.0571 0.1915 0.1344 235% 4 4.6613 0.0013
17 2 0.0972 0.2550 0.1577 162% 2 16.0465 0.0045
18 2 0.0666 0.2763 0.2097 315% 2 15.5402 0.0043
19 2 0.1001 0.2676 0.1675 167% 2 15.6466 0.0043
20 2 0.0548 0.2825 0.2277 415% 2 15.5407 0.0043
Table 30. Experimental Results: Experiments 21-24
Experiment Network Type Expected Utility Top Insertion Utility Utility ∆ % Utility ∆ # Arcs Comp Time (s) Comp Time (h)
21 2 0.0807 0.2563 0.1756 218% 4 20986.547 5.830
22 2 0.0533 0.2261 0.1728 324% 4 21808.150 6.058
23 2 0.0994 0.2687 0.1693 170% 4 20643.413 5.734
24 2 0.0636 0.2259 0.1624 255% 4 22119.201 6.144
The results shown in Tables 29 and 30 show huge improvement on insertion utility
when compared to the expected utility for a random insertion. Each experiment
yielded at least a 150% increase in utility, which we relate to an increase in information
collection potential. Some networks experienced increases over 900%. Experiments 11
and 14 yielded 972% and 914% increases respectively. While the table shows a marked
increase over the average utility for small world networks, the percent change in utility
remains similar to the results found with scale free networks. This response allowed
for the assessment of the largest proportion changes in terms of utility, meaning the
use of this methodology should improve information collection while minimizing the
risk of an inserted asset. The utility plots for Experiments 1-20 are shown in Appendix
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B.
Robustness Assessment.
For the regression, the factors of interest were number of nodes, average local cluster-
ing, density, coefficient of variation, and network type. The results of the regression
are shown in Figure 19.
Figure 19. Experimentation Regression Results
None of the five independent variables were significant in determining the overall per-
cent change in utility from the expected value of a random insertion to the optimal
insertion strategy. This suggests that the model outlined provides a robust analy-
sis approach that is not affected by network type, size, or other inherent structure
characteristics. Figure 20 shows the residuals for the initial regression. It seems that
the variance of error term is not constant, which is an assumption for linear regression.
To remedy this problem, an inverse transformation was applied to the response fol-
lowing the application of the Box-Cox Test, the results of which are shown in Figure
21. The model also seems to have high variance inflation factors (VIFs) which result
from dependent factors in the model. While the assumption of independent factors
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is important for linear regression, the goal of this assessment is not to predict util-
ity, but to determine methodology robustness. The prediction of the overall percent
increase in utility has no value in terms of this analysis. Even if this response could
be predicted, there would be no insight provided on the insertion scenario resulting
in this percent increase, and thus, no operational value. Therefore, less emphasis was
put on decreasing these high VIFs.
Figure 20. Error Variance
Figure 21. Box-Cox Transformation
The regression following this transformation and removal of highly multicollinear
factors yielded the same results and followed both the constant variance and normality
assumptions on the error term. This validation is shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22. Transformed Model Results
While the elicitation of the inherent costs of creating relationships within a network
is outside of the scope of this analysis, it is important to note that as the inherent
cost increases, the number of relationships involved in the top insertion candidate
decrease, which is a trivial conclusion.
4.4 Analysis Summary
This chapter investigates the methodology presented in Chapter 3. A designed exper-
iment of twenty-four randomly generated networks was implemented to test model
performance, specifically from a robustness perspective. The results indicate that the
methodology developed is robust to network type and other network characteristics.
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V. Conclusions
This research was able to identify a quantitative methodology for the evaluation of
insertion scenarios from a risk-benefit perspective. Current undercover operations
seem to only utilize subjective and qualitative definitions of risk and benefit and do
not consider the structure of the network minimally, if at all. Chapter 2 outlined past
research crucial to the formulation of this methodology and its application. The most
crucial of these ideas included network type, Laplacian centrality, and past network
utility models. Chapter 3 then outlined the methodology itself, also applying it to a
real-world network. Chapter 4 assessed the robustness of the methodology through
the use of linear regression.
5.1 Contributions
Social Network.
This research was able to extend Laplacian centrality to the insertion of nodes while
maintaining the Laplacian energy relationship outlined previously by Qi et al. [45].
An specific extension to Jackson and Wolinsky’s [52] node utility model was also
provided, followed by a generalized formulation of the specific model. The specific
methodology implemented the Laplacian energy extension along with other local,
intermediate, global, and full network measures, in order to determine the utility of
differing node insertion scenarios, specifically for the Zachary Karate Club Network,
a staple network in the SNA community.
Operational.
Operationally, this research combined qualitative and quantitative methods for the
comparison of different node insertion scenarios. Previously, primarily qualitative
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methods were used purely based on subject-matter expertise. With the methodology
provided, SME input is elicited and incorporated into the model to act as a benefit for
inserted relationships. This research also showed that attempting to create a higher
number of inserted relationships does not yield the highest overall utility in terms of
information collection potential; due to the amount of risk that is inherent with the
creation of more relationships in a network.
The utility of any insertion strategy provided can not only be assessed, but also
quantitatively compared to different insertion strategies, within a single network.
The creation of a portfolio of options for a specific network is also possible to allow
flexibility in the decision-maker process, allowing for the most intelligent insertion
strategy.
5.2 Future Research
The first extension would be to Clandestine Networks, where the certainty within a
network varies. Carley et al. [20] previously identifies the risks involved in determin-
ing vital actors within a clandestine network, so a methodology already exists that
could be adapted to address this problem. Because real-world networks are inherently
uncertain; the pursuit of this research would provide greater fidelity for the node in-
sertion problem.
This research does not consider the secondary or tertiary effects of an insertion in
to a network, and assumes that new relationships are created simultaneously and
instantaneously. If an extension to dynamic networks was made, changes to other
parts of the network (over time) could be quantified. In addition, the actual process
of insertion could be analyzed. One could also obtain the answer to the question of
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when to create which relationships, ultimately providing step-by-step instruction for
the inserted actor.
Currently the research is also limited to one network, where an insertion must be
made. In real-world counterterrorism operations, there are hundreds of possible net-
works to choose from. One of these networks might be better suited for insertion
than others based on size, structure, or even qualitative characteristics of the actors
within it. For this reason, a methodology for the comparison of insertion scenarios
between networks would be beneficial.
While degree assortivity was used as the network functionality metric for the spe-
cific application of node insertion, changing the groupings, perhaps to qualities of
each actor, could provide more realistic results for the node insertion problem.
The inherent cost values used in both the specific application and experimental por-
tion of the analysis were purely placeholders. If more analysis could be done on true
costs of building relationships within an enemy network, the insertion strategies would
provide more accurate results. In addition, just as Jackson and Wolinsky provide a
cij to identify the cost of keeping a relationship between vi and vj, these inherent
costs could change for each relationships, or even increase depending on if how many
relationships the inserted node already maintains.
With the application to a real-world, operational network as a case study, it would
be beneficial to look at differing the individual node bias metrics, applying legitimate
SME weight elicitation techniques, and creating different benefits and risk measures
for more node insertion purposes..
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For this research, the maximum number of relationships allowed was governed by
the average degree of the network. Allowing for more than this value would increase
the computational time to find the optimal solution, but also allows for the elicita-
tion of insertion strategies that are near the true optimal for the network and are
not bound by the average degree. With this extension, the application of heuristics
would be necessary due to the combinatorial nature of the node insertion problem.
In addition, the largest network involved in the experimentation was a 200 node net-
work. The analysis of larger networks, perhaps an order of magnitude larger, could
provide more insight on the node insertion problem, which would be made possible
by heuristic application.
The research focuses on a composite network, where all of the different layers are
combined into a single adjacency matrix. Extending to layered networks could pro-
vide a higher degree of fidelity and make the methodology more operationally relevant
by assessing the benefit of insertions into different layers of the network. These layers
could be based on different types of affiliations or other means of network disaggre-
gation.
Because Laplacian centrality is relatively new, its correlation with other SNA mea-
sures is not known quantitatively. One could apply the methodology of Guzman
et al. [6]to provide quantitative and definitive correlation measures for Laplacian
centrality. In addition, there seemed to be correlation between the leading eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix and network functionality. While this relationship was
not explored it could provide faster computation for overall functionality of a network.
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Previously mentioned was the inherent domination of an insertion strategy compared
to the sum of its parts, specifically with Laplacian centrality. Node insertion has
not been quantitatively analyzed prior to this research, so the tendencies for other
centrality measures in terms of this problem are not known. Future research could
include the analysis of other centrality and structural measures, which would then
lead into research possibly involving multiple insertions or even the creation of an
insertion centrality measure, which might be able to differentiate more influential
insertion strategies based on the structure of the network.
5.3 Overall Conclusions
While current Social Network Analysis focuses on network resiliency, interdiction,
and influence, more insight into the counterterrorism landscape can be gained by the
evolution of these tactical methods. This involves the use of not node changes within
a network, but node insertion. The current system for insertion of undercover oper-
atives into criminal networks seems to be ineffective, basing the risks and benefits of
an insertion on qualitative methods. These methods most likely result in a random
insertion scenario that lacks potential for information collection in addition to provid-
ing unnecessary risk based on the structure of the network. Network insertions made
in an effective way provide the greatest opportunity for successful counterterrorism
operations.
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Appendix A. Model Implementation Code
1 function [edgeAddition totalLapEnergyG totalChange risk utility ...
best benefit indiv w t bb cc dd] = ...
LaplacianEnergyFixed parfor(A, weights)
2 %elimiate memory problems by eliminating yy alltogether, and just ...
using the
3 %m matrix. still gets large but does not have to have a number ...
rows, just
4 %the number of arcs added in that scenario across...
5
6 if ischar(A) ==1
7 fid = fopen(A);
8 C = textscan(fid, '%s %s');
9 fclose(fid);
10
11 C{1}(1) = [];
12 C{1}(1) = [];
13 C{2}(1) = [];
14 C{2}(1) = [];
15
16 rows = str2double(C{1}(:))+1;
17 cols = str2double(C{2}(:))+1;
18
19 list = [rows cols];
20 A = EdgeToAdj(list);
21
22 clear C list rows cols
23 end
24
25 [a b] = size(A);
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26
27 tic;
28
29 %nonNormDegreeG = sum(A)';
30 degreeG = sum(A)';
31 %degreeG = (nonNormDegreeG - min(nonNormDegreeG)) / ( ...
max(nonNormDegreeG) - min(nonNormDegreeG) );
32 avgdeg = sum(sum(A))/a;
33 degreeMatG = [degreeG degreeG.ˆ2];
34 clear degreeG
35 sumDegreeMatG = sum(degreeMatG');
36
37 %get average degree
38 medge = sum(degreeMatG(:,1));
39 avgDegree = medge/a;
40
41
42 %individual node weight
43 %w = rand(1,a)*10;
44 dw = degreeMatG(:,1)';
45 dw =(dw - min(dw)) / ( max(dw) - min(dw) );
46
47 %subject matter expert weights
48 smew = weights';
49 %smew = [0.119 0.4984 0.9597 0.3404 0.5853 0.2238];
50 smew = (smew - min(smew)) / ( max(smew) - min(smew) );
51
52 delt = 0.5;
53 nonNormw = delt*(dw)+(1-delt)*smew;
54 w = (nonNormw - min(nonNormw)) / ( max(nonNormw) - min(nonNormw) );
55
56 %total Laplacian Energy for Graph G
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57 totalLapEnergyG = sum(sumDegreeMatG);
58
59 %G Assortivity
60 Q = GetAssort(A,degreeMatG(:,1)');
61
62 %closeness
63 nonNormbc=closeness(A);
64 bc = (nonNormbc - min(nonNormbc)) / ( max(nonNormbc) - ...
min(nonNormbc) );
65
66
67 %we transform graph G to graph G* where G* is the graph with ...
inserted nodes
68 %and edges. To do this we use an edge addition list
69
70 %numRel = maxmimum number of relationships to consider
71 numRel = floor(avgDegree);
72 %numRel = 2;
73 [total indiv] = nchooseuptok(a,numRel);
74 indiv = [0;indiv];
75
76 %edge addition matrix. holds all possible scenarios
77 edgeAddition = zeros(total,numRel);
78
79 %inherent costs
80 inherent = 0.2;
81
82 v = [1:a];
83 count = 1;
84
85 %where to start with the new m matrix. using parfor, parralel ...
processing
85
86 rowCount1 = 1;
87 output=cell(total,numRel);
88 for i= 1:numRel
89
90 % get all possible combinations for relationships
91 m = nchoosek(v,i);
92 [c d] = size(m);
93
94
95 rowCount2 = rowCount1 + indiv(i+1)-1;
96
97 edgeAddition([rowCount1:rowCount2],[1:i]) = m(:,[1:i]);
98
99 %increment row start to create ematrix
100 rowCount1 = rowCount2 + 1;
101 parfor j = 1:c
102
103 out = somefun(A,m,a,inherent,d,bc,w,j,i)
104 %increment count
105 count = count + 1;
106 output{j,i}=out;
107 end
108
109 clear m
110 end
111 par out = [];
112 for q = 1:numRel
113 par out=[par out; cell2mat(output(:,q))];
114 end
115
116 totalLapEnergyGPrime=par out(:,1);
117 QG=par out(:,2);
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118 NonweightedBen=par out(:,3);
119 NontotalCost1=par out(:,4);
120 totalCost2=par out(:,5);
121
122
123 %importance of node scenario i, normalized
124 NonNormTotalChange = totalLapEnergyGPrime-totalLapEnergyG;
125 totalChange = (NonNormTotalChange - min(NonNormTotalChange)) / ( ...
max(NonNormTotalChange) - min(NonNormTotalChange) );
126 totalChange = totalChange';
127
128 %absoluate mod change from G to G'
129 NonNormModChange = abs(QG-Q);
130 modChange = (NonNormModChange - min(NonNormModChange)) / ( ...
max(NonNormModChange) - min(NonNormModChange) );
131
132 %benefit for each node added
133
134 %normalizing indiv node bias
135 weightedBen = (NonweightedBen - min(NonweightedBen)) / ( ...
max(NonweightedBen) - min(NonweightedBen) );
136
137 %squared
138 squared = 1;
139
140 %normalizing closeness cost
141 totalCost1 = (NontotalCost1 - min(NontotalCost1)) / ( ...
max(NontotalCost1) - min(NontotalCost1) );
142
143 %utility = totalChange-totalCost;
144 benefit = totalChange'+weightedBen;
145 risk = totalCost1 + totalCost2 + modChange;
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146
147 %normalizing risk and benefit
148 benefit = (benefit - min(benefit)) / ( max(benefit) - ...
min(benefit) );
149 risk = (risk - min(risk)) / ( max(risk) - min(risk) );
150
151 %weighting risk and benefit
152 wb = .50;
153 wr = 1-wb;
154 utility = wb*benefit-wr*risk;
155
156 [c loc] = max(utility);
157 best = [c loc];
158
159 t = toc;
160 %s = sort(utility);
161
162 %figure out way to plot without doing by hand
163 %only works with up to 4 arcs
164 %for i=1:total
165 % switch color(i)
166 % case 1
167 % hold on
168 % plot(i,utility(i),'ko')
169 % case 2
170 % hold on
171 % plot(i,utility(i),'go')
172 % case 3
173 % hold on
174 % plot(i,utility(i),'bo')
175 % case 4
176 % hold on
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177 % plot(i,utility(i),'ro')
178 % end
179 %end
180
181 totalMat = [1:total]';
182
183 figure()
184 plot(totalMat,utility,'.');
185
186 %labels and axis and plots and everything
187 hold on
188 %plot(totalChange,'x')
189 hold on
190 %axis([0, total + 1,min(utility)-10, max(totalChange)+10])
191 title('Insertion Scenario vs. Value')
192 ylabel('Value')
193 xlabel('Node Insertion Scenario')
194 %labels = cellstr(num2str([color]'));
195 %labels = cellstr(num2str([totalMat]));
196 %text(double(totalMat(:,1)), double(utility(1,:)'), labels, ...
'VerticalAlignment','bottom', ...
197 % 'HorizontalAlignment','right')
198 grid on
199
200 bb = best(1);
201 cc = mean(utility);
202 dd = edgeAddition(best(2),:);
203 end
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Appendix B. Small World Generator Code
1 function [A density avgd edges] = generateSmallWorld2(n,d2,p)
2
3 %create a regular matrix that has n nodes and a total degree of d2
4 A = zeros(n,n);
5 d = d2/2;
6 %d=d2;
7 for i = 1:n
8 if i+d≤n
9 A(i,[i+1:i+d]) = 1;
10 else A(i,:) = 1;
11 A(i,[i+d-n+1:i]) = 0;
12 end
13 end
14 A = A+A';
15
16 %rewire
17 %removing rewired edges
18
19 %get random probs
20 rewire = rand(1,n);
21 rewire = rewire<p;
22
23 %find arcs to remove
24 %remove = ceil(rand(1,n)*d2);
25 remove = rand(n,n).*A;
26
27 %find arcs to add
28 add = ceil(rand(1,n)*n);
29
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30 for j = 1:n
31 if rewire(j)== 1
32 %make sure the added arcs do not already exist for the ...
current node
33 while A(j,add(j)) == 1 | | add(j) == j
34 add(j) = ceil(rand()*n);
35 end
36
37 %remove highest random edge value
38 %keep connected graph
39 check = sum(A);
40 [m loc] = max(remove(j,:));
41
42 %check for connectedness
43 a = 2;
44 while a > 1
45
46 A(j,loc) = 0;
47 A(loc,j) = 0;
48
49 [ci sizes] = components(sparse(A));
50 [a b] = size(sizes);
51
52 %if new deletion makes unconnected, readd the deleted arc and
53 %choose new node for rewiring from the second component
54 if a > 1
55
56 %find shorcut to add from other component
57 while ci(add(j)) == ci(j) | | (A(j,add(j)) == 1 | | add(j) ...
== j)
58 add(j) = ceil(rand()*n);
59 end
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60
61 remove(j,loc) = 0;
62 remove(loc,j) = 0;
63
64 A(j,add(j)) = 1;
65 A(add(j),j) = 1;
66
67 else
68
69 remove(j,loc) = 0;
70 remove(loc,j) = 0;
71
72 %add shortcuts
73 A(j,add(j)) = 1;
74 A(add(j),j) = 1;
75 end
76
77 [ci sizes] = components(sparse(A));
78 [a b] = size(sizes);
79 end
80
81
82 end
83 end
84
85 edges = (sum(sum(A))/2);
86 density = edges/(n*(n-1)/2);
87 avgd = sum(sum(A))/n;
88 end
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Appendix C. Scale Free PNDCG Inputs
30 Nodes, α = 2.8 30 Nodes, α = 2.2
IS DIRECTED N IS DIRECTED N
RANDOM SEED 0 RANDOM SEED 0
NUM NODES 30 NUM NODES 30
PCT DEVIATION FROM EX 100 PCT DEVIATION FROM EX 100
EX FILE ex U 1000.txt EX FILE ex U 1000.txt
DEGREE DIST 2 DEGREE DIST 2
POWER DIST EXP 2.8 POWER DIST EXP 2.2
DEGREE DIST FILE degree.txt DEGREE DIST FILE degree.txt
PCT CLUSTERING 0 PCT CLUSTERING 0
NUM OUTPUT FILES 5 NUM OUTPUT FILES 5
OUTPUT FILE START NUM 6 OUTPUT FILE START NUM 6
OUTPUT DATA FILE outputgraph2.txt OUTPUT DATA FILE outputgraph7.txt
200 Nodes, α = 2.8 200 Nodes, α = 2.2
IS DIRECTED N IS DIRECTED N
RANDOM SEED 0 RANDOM SEED 0
NUM NODES 200 NUM NODES 200
PCT DEVIATION FROM EX 100 PCT DEVIATION FROM EX 100
EX FILE ex U 1000.txt EX FILE ex U 1000.txt
DEGREE DIST 2 DEGREE DIST 2
POWER DIST EXP 2.8 POWER DIST EXP 2.2
DEGREE DIST FILE degree.txt DEGREE DIST FILE degree.txt
PCT CLUSTERING 0 PCT CLUSTERING 0
NUM OUTPUT FILES 5 NUM OUTPUT FILES 5
OUTPUT FILE START NUM 42 OUTPUT FILE START NUM 42
OUTPUT DATA FILE outputgraph8.txt OUTPUT DATA FILE outputgraph13.txt
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Appendix D. Quad Chart
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